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Abstract 
 Sectarian conflict is a recent phenomenon in Pakistan‘s history. Pakistan 
lost its secular nature when it underwent a process of Islamization during Zia-ul-
Haq‘s rule, which created extremist Sunni militants. The Iranian Revolution and 
Saudi religious donations also caused the Pakistani population to become more 
religious and the target of a Saudi-Iranian proxy war. In this thesis, I explore how 
the stability-instability paradox helps explain why the Saudi-Iranian proxy war 
will lead to domestic instability and increased sectarian conflict in Pakistan once 
Iran acquires nuclear weapons. The Saudi-Iranian proxy war has manifested itself 
in sectarian terms in Pakistan because both countries fund religious schools and 
militant political organizations. Because Iran and Saudi Arabia are competing for 
regional hegemony, they have turned Pakistan into a battleground between pro-
Saudi Sunni forces and pro-Iran Shiite forces. When Iran acquires nuclear 
weapons, Pakistani Shiite groups will become aggressive and Iran will become 
emboldened in its support of unconventional warfare thus leading to domestic 
instability and increased sectarian conflict in Pakistan.  
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 Preface 
Recent events that have been taking place in Pakistan worry me. The 
majority of headlines are about terrorist acts, sectarian violence, a failing 
economy and political corruption in Pakistan. When I lived in Pakistan about a 
decade ago, I remember economic improvement, a flourishing tourism industry 
and a rich culture. My childhood is filled with memories of basant (a cultural kite 
flying festival) and joyous weddings at which I would wear colorful clothing and 
dance the night away with my cousins.  
However, today‘s reality is much different from the Pakistan I once knew. 
When being Sunni or Shia did not matter, now it does. When sleeveless shirts 
were accepted a decade ago, now women are stared at and feel uncomfortable. 
When homes had electricity for most of the day, now it is only available for about 
fifteen hours. When families relied on gas heaters to keep them warm in the 
winter, now gas is completely unreliable. When the most enjoyable day of a 
wedding used to be the mehndi, as it was filled with music and dances, now many 
families have forfeited that tradition. More women are now covering their hair. 
They are also forsaking higher education in order to get married. Pakistan is not 
only becoming more Islamic, it is becoming more Wahhabi (a strict and 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam found in Saudi Arabia).  
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Through my research, I was able to discover why Pakistan is heading in a 
direction I fear. Why is everyone in Pakistan gradually becoming more religious? 
Why are more Pakistanis discussing Islamic duties when we used to discuss 
Pakistani musicians? Today, many people have replaced their fashionable 
clothing for veils and beards. As the country is slowly starting to resemble Saudi 
Arabia, the once vibrant Pakistan culture is eroding. Having lived in Pakistan for 
several years and being of Pakistani descent, I am concerned about the future of 
the country and want it to prosper. I am proud of being Pakistani and do not want 
Pakistani traditions and culture to disappear.  
Issues such as political corruption, religious extremism, terrorism, Balochi 
nationalism, sectarian violence, population growth and a struggling economy 
negatively affect the future of Pakistan. I believe that Pakistan holds potential in 
the international sphere as a major actor. The country has geostrategic importance 
and is especially intriguing because it has weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear 
weapons give Pakistan a backbone; however, with great power comes great 
responsibility, and Pakistan should be careful of the development, security and 
use and of its nuclear weapons. Certain principles that do not apply to the 
majority of states in this world pertain to Pakistan because it has weapons of mass 
destruction. The current situation in Pakistan makes possessing nuclear weapons 
complicated. For example, the existence of terrorist groups makes nuclear theft 
more likely.   
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New, current trends within the country, such as the rise of sectarian 
violence, are worrying. It is important to analyze why these trends are occurring 
and how to best circumvent them.  To further complicate the issue, Pakistan‘s 
neighbor, Iran, is suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons. The prospect of an 
Iranian bomb has caused extensive debate and action in the international 
community and because Pakistan is Iran‘s neighbor, it has a large stake in the 
discussion. I believe that before the Iranian bomb comes into existence, Pakistan 
should analyze historical relations and current trends, and then formulate a 
cohesive strategy in dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran. My interests are with a 
prosperous, stable Pakistan, and by exploring the consequences of an Iranian 
nuclear bomb on Pakistan‘s domestic stability, I hope to improve the chances of a 
stable Pakistan.   
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Introduction  
The fact that Pakistan does not want another nuclear-armed neighbor may 
seem obvious, but recent developments in the Iranian nuclear program make that 
future probable.  Currently, Pakistan‘s official stance on Iran‘s nuclear program is 
that Iran has the right to acquire nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but should 
stay within the confines of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, 
Pakistan does not support an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Many argue that 
an Iranian nuclear weapon is looming. Some, such as U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta and Israeli politician Ehud Barak believe that in less than a year‘s 
time, Iran will test its first nuclear bomb (Afsaneh 2012). Although Iran signed 
the NPT, it is now developing infrastructure and technology beyond what is 
necessary for nuclear energy. Due to these developments in Iran‘s nuclear 
program, the international community should prepare for a scenario in which Iran 
does have nuclear weapons. There is ample research regarding the implications of 
an Iranian bomb for the Middle East, US and Israel.  
The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, envisioned Pakistan to 
be a pan-Islamic state. However, Pakistan underwent an Islamization when the 
Deobandi (a conservative school of Islamic thought) military general Zia-ul-Haq 
came into power. Similarly, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which institutionalized 
Shia Islam in Iran, caused sectarian tensions to inflame in Pakistan, a Sunni 
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majority country. Because many of Pakistan‘s domestic and foreign policies have 
been favorable to Sunnis, the difference in ideology between Iran and Pakistan 
has been the basis of most conflict between the two states. Furthermore, sectarian 
differences have also led to a system of alliances among Muslim states that are 
based on ideology, and this works to Pakistan‘s advantage because Sunni leaders 
control a large number of governments in the Middle East.  
Today, sectarian violence ravages prospects of nationalism and unity in 
Pakistan. One source of instability in Pakistan is religious conflict incurred by 
fundamentalist groups. However, this violence is sectarian (between groups 
within a single religion), rather than interfaith (between difference religions). The 
formation of Islamic religious schools during the 1980s created religious 
extremists that now massacre Pakistan‘s Shiite minority. The year 2012 marked 
the highest number of sectarian driven terrorist acts. Just two months into 2013, 
the number of deaths is already more than half than the total for 2012‘s count. 
I would like to explore how the already increasing sectarian violence in 
Pakistan will be affected once Iran acquires nuclear weapons. This paper will be a 
case study of the stability-instability paradox of Pakistan and a nuclear-armed 
Iran. The stability-instability paradox explains the relationship between two states 
that do not engage in nuclear war, but are emboldened in their use of conventional 
and unconventional warfare after acquiring nuclear weapons. I am interested in 
the fact that Pakistan, a Sunni majority state that possesses nuclear weapons and is 
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plagued by sectarian conflict, may soon face a Shiite majority, nuclear-armed 
neighbor. This topic is important because it could explain how Pakistan will be 
impacted and potentially set a precedent for Sunni and Shiite communities in the 
Middle East. Furthermore, it may make Pakistani politicians aware of the 
situation and realize the effects of a potential Iranian nuclear weapon. It may lead 
them to implement changes before this scenario becomes reality.  
My topic is security in Southeast Asia and my subtopic is domestic 
stability in Pakistan. My dependent variable is domestic stability and sectarian 
conflict and my independent variables are the Saudi-Iranian proxy war and 
nuclear weapons. In this thesis, I explore security and stability in South Asia. I 
look at Pakistani relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia and explore how an Iranian 
nuclear bomb would further destabilize Pakistan and increase sectarian conflict. 
Although it seems logical that Pakistan would not want another nuclear-armed 
neighbor, the factors why are not apparent. It is also not apparent how Pakistan 
will be affected in such a scenario.  
The objective of this paper is to explain factors that complicate the 
prospects of a stable Pakistan, given that Iran may develop nuclear weapons. 
Deterrence theory asserts that nuclear weapons create stability between two states 
but does not adequately elucidate the situation in South Asia. Although I agree 
that Iran and Pakistan will not use nuclear weapons on one another, I believe that 
Pakistan will experience instability and conflict. In this thesis, I explore the 
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implications of the stability-instability paradox on Pakistan‘s domestic scene. I 
aim to look beyond explicit Iranian-Pakistani relationship and their policies 
towards one another and include other factors such as the Saudi-Iranian proxy 
war.  
The research question I wish to explore is how does the stability-
instability paradox help explain why the Saudi-Iranian proxy war will cause 
Pakistan to experience domestic instability and increased sectarian conflict 
once Iran acquires nuclear weapons? First, in chapter 1, I do a literature review 
in which I will describe nuclear deterrence theory, the stability-instability paradox 
and the views of proponents and opponents of nuclear proliferation. In Chapter 2, 
I outline my methodology and explain why I chose my cases and variables. I 
outline a political history of Pakistan and explain how the intended secular state 
became an Islamic state in chapter 3. In chapter 4, I give a brief overview of 
Pakistan‘s and Iran‘s nuclear weapons program and finish the section by 
presenting the prevailing consequences of a future with an Iranian nuclear 
weapons. Next in chapter 5, I describe the Pakistani-Iranian relationship, Saudi-
Pakistan relations and Saudi-Iranian relations. These are important because they 
demonstrate shifting relations in which Pakistan has slowly become more friendly 
with Saudi Arabia rather than Iran. In chapter 6, I outline the history of 
sectarianism in Pakistan, starting from its inception after the Iranian Revolution to 
modern day. In the second section of the same chapter, I discuss Saudi and Iranian 
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involvement in Pakistan‘s sectarianism. In chapter 7 which is also my findings 
chapter, I will the stability-instability paradox to sectarian conflict by describing 
the significance of a possible Iranian nuclear weapon on Pakistan‘s domestic 
stability and sectarian conflict. I conclude the thesis by recommending policies.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
1.1 Nuclear Deterrence Theory 
 
Deterrence is a way to restrain your opponent‘s actions by having a 
credible and adverse consequence (Farooq 2004: 5). To function, deterrence 
theory relies upon willingness and fear: if a powerful actor is willing to commit an 
aggression, another actor is deterred from aggressing first for fear of retaliation. 
The simple idea of deterring an enemy gave rise to nuclear deterrence theory. 
Deterrence assumes a rivalry between two factions such as between India and 
Pakistan. Another assumption of deterrence is that nuclear war, conventional war 
and unconventional war are at separate levels of operation. Conventional warfare 
is conflict between two states on a military battlefield using traditional weapons, 
such as guns. Unconventional warfare utilizes untraditional weapons such as 
chemical and biological weapons, which ―enable a resistance movement or 
insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force‖ (Grdovic 
2010: 136). Since conventional and unconventional are so unlike, deterrence 
applies to each level of defense differently.  
Nuclear deterrence theory was modeled from the relationship between the 
United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) during the 
Cold War. Both the rivals were nuclear powers and engaged in an aggressive arms 
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race, but over a span of rough fifty years, neither used nuclear weapons on the 
other. One of the main operating principles at the height of the Cold War was 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The US and USSR had expansively built 
up their nuclear arms and had the capability to annihilate the other. MAD, 
formulated by US Secretary of State Robert McNamara during the Reagan 
administration, is a military strategy in which use of weapons of mass destruction 
results in the complete devastation of both sides because the aggressor state will 
experience an inevitable retaliation, or second strike. MAD assumes that the 
victim state will survive the nuclear attack and launch a second strike on the 
aggressor state because a second strike is justified (Kenny 1985: 38).  It also 
presumes that states will not use of weapons of mass destruction on other nuclear-
armed states, due to fear of revenge, as it will lead to the destruction of both 
parties. There are no winners. The purpose of nuclear weapons is therefore, not to 
destroy, but to deter. Nuclear weapons are for security and nuclear stability. The 
Cold War demonstrated that nuclear weapons were not just the most destructive 
bomb, they were an instrument of foreign policy. 
There are three requirements for the successful operation of nuclear 
deterrence: rationality, credibility and capability. Nuclear deterrence will only 
work if the leaders of the state are rational. Rational leaders must be capable of 
calculating the risks and benefits involved with an action. The fear caused by 
nuclear weapons causes a rational leader to feel ―a high degree of objective and 
11 
 
 
 
subjective insecurity [that will] postpone any attack‖ (Browhow et al. 1986: 91). 
Deterrence requires rational utilitarianism, also called instrumental rationality, in 
which leaders make decisions based on how much they can gain. On the contrary, 
Max Weber‘s value rationality theory assumes that leaders make decisions for 
achieving a specific value such as an ideological, religious or psychological goal 
(Paul et al 2004: 6). In such a circumstance, deterrence cannot work because these 
leaders strive to pursue intangible goals despite the physical costs, such as their 
lives, and are not concerned of how many casualties they incur. For example, 
many view North Korea as having a revisionist dream and do not believe that it 
will be deterred from using nuclear weapons on a more powerful state. Second, in 
order to be deterred and to fear retaliation, a nuclear state must believe in another 
state‘s credibility, or that it actually has nuclear weapons and would use them. 
Nuclear states will only be deterred if they know another state possesses nuclear 
weapons. Last, nuclear-armed states must broadcast their capability to deter an 
attack and carry out an assured second strike. As states acquire nuclear weapons 
to deter an attack from their enemies, they must also be willing to retaliate. If a 
state appears unwilling to conduct a second strike, it does not instill fear in the 
enemy and consequently deterrence will not work. Therefore, a state must 
broadcast its capability of a retaliatory  nuclear second strike. 
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1.2 Stability-Instability Paradox 
 
Prior to the Cold War, the United States was the international hegemon 
until the USSR challenged its power. Next, the international stage entered into a 
phase of bipolarity in which there was reasonable stability. However, with the fall 
of the Soviet Union and relative weak power of emerging Russia, the US 
remained the sole hegemon. Scholars argue that a unipolar world may be the most 
unstable as stability is often maintained by a balance of power, as exhibited by the 
Cold War. (Wohlforth 1999: 5).  A balance of power is a scenario in which no 
power is overpoweringly dominant (Chatterjee 1972: 51). There are three types of 
balance of power: hard balancing which entails an ―intense interstate rivalry‖ 
complete with military buildup, soft balancing which involves security alliances, 
and asymmetric balancing which ―refers to efforts by nation states to balance and 
contain indirect threats posed by sub-national actors such as terrorist groups,‖ 
(Paul et al 2004: 3). Great powers can greatly influence the regional balance of 
power. For example, there existed a balance of power between Iran and Iraq in the 
Middle East. However, the defeat of Iraqi Baathist regime and the invasion of the 
US caused the power dynamics to change (Barzegar 2010: 74).  Now, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia fight for the position of regional hegemon and have their respective 
spheres of influence in which they both engage in soft balancing. 
Security is the absence of fear or threat against the values of a nation 
(Wolfers 1952). During the Cold War, the US and USSR utilized negative 
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security. Negative security asserts that states look at their spheres of influence as a 
matter of national security because when an ally is threatened, the state is also 
threatened. Security is not limited to their domestic territory (Yusoff and Soltani 
2012: 244).  
The Cold War exemplified negative security and nuclear deterrence 
theory. The US and the USSR competed for their spheres of influence in a 
competition between capitalism versus communism but their rivalry never 
resulted in a direct military or nuclear confrontation. The US considered much of 
the western part of the world its sphere of influence, while the USSR believed the 
eastern part of the world its sphere. They used proxies and asymmetric warfare in 
order to avoid nuclear conflict (Krepton).Their shadow war, fought in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia, served to support the faction most aligned with their 
interests in their respective sphere of influence. By doing so, they 
―internationalized their national security‖ (Yusoff and Soltani 2012: 245). By 
either facilitating a revolutionary political system or supporting the existing 
government, the result was often civil war. One of the most glaring examples is 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the Cold War. The USSR entered 
Afghanistan to support the pro-Soviet communist Afghan government. The US 
thought a pro-Soviet government would threaten its allies in the area and 
consequently funded and provided arms to the anti-Soviet faction, the 
revolutionary mujahideen, meaning ―strugglers‖ (Hughes 2008: 329). This US 
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covert operation was one of the most expensive (Time Magazine 2003). 
Eventually, the Soviets withdrew and the US-supported side was able to establish 
power.  
The US and the USSR‘s actions led Glen Snyder to create the stability-
instability paradox. It argues that,   
lowering the probability that a conventional war will escalate to a 
nuclear war reduces the danger of starting a conventional war,  
thus, this low likelihood of escalation—referred to here as 
‗stability‘—makes conventional war less dangerous, and possibly, 
as a result, more likely (Chari 2003: 19).  
 
In other words, nuclear weapons create stability at the nuclear war level but 
induce instability at the lower level through mechanisms of conventional and 
unconventional warfare (militancy, insurgency, proxy war and terrorism) (Dixit 
2012: 121). In 1954, B. H. Liddell Hart also explained that, ―to the extent that the 
H[hydrogen] bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the 
possibility of limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.‖ The stability-
instability paradox also asserts that the possession of nuclear weapons may 
encourage conflict because states are complacent in the fact that their aggressions 
will not escalate to nuclear war (Dittmer 2001).Two nuclear-armed adversaries 
avoid using weapons of mass destruction but are willing to engage in limited 
military skirmishes against one another. The fear of conflict escalating to nuclear 
war facilitates violence, and consequently, instability results. As Kapur describes, 
―The unlikelihood of nuclear escalation reduces nuclear weapons‘ ability to deter 
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conventional conflict, thereby making low-level aggression more likely‖ (2009: 
39). Therefore, the high cost of nuclear war encourages unconventional war.   
To put it simply, the stability-instability paradox means no nuclear war, 
limited conventional war and heightened unconventional war. The theory signals 
that nuclear weapons deter and create fear but do not keep the peace; they cause 
nuclear deterrence to work but not deterrence in general. In other words, they 
afford protection against a nuclear attack but not other forms of aggression.  
Many scholars use Pakistan‘s risky actions in the Kargil War to 
demonstrate the stability-instability paradox. Nuclear-armed India and Pakistan 
fought in the Kargil War in May 1999 and this was the first war between the two 
rival states since they acquired nuclear weapons. During the conflict, Pakistan 
supported insurgent groups to fight Indian soldiers in Kashmir, a disputed 
territory that the two countries were fighting over. Pakistan supported Kashmiri 
mujahedeen but did not want the involvement of Pakistani soldiers (Abbas 2005: 
172). In other words, Pakistan was first willing to engage in unconventional 
warfare but not conventional war. However, war broke out when Pakistani 
soldiers and Kashmiri militants crossed over onto the Indian side of the Line of 
Control (the de facto border), and resulted in conventional war. Most importantly, 
this conventional warfare did not escalate to nuclear war and was limited in 
casualties.  Pakistan‘s actions countered traditional deterrence theory, which 
stipulates that nuclear states act more carefully than nonnuclear states. According 
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to Sagan, once Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons, people inside the 
Pakistani military argued, ―This is our chance to do something about Kashmir‖ 
and convinced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif into sending Pakistani soldiers 
pretending to be Kashmiri insurgents into India (2007). Sagan, as well as other 
researchers, such as Panday, believe that the stability-instability paradox 
emboldened Pakistan in their use unconventional and was able to limit the extent 
of conventional war, for fear of nuclear escalation. Because casualties during the 
Kargil War were relatively small and because Pakistan increased its use of proxies 
in Kashmir, the Kargil War attested to the belief that nuclear weapons encourage 
unconventional war and limit conventional war.  
 Rajagopalan argues the contrary. He asserts that the stability-instability 
paradox is not applicable to Pakistan‘s support of Kashmiri insurgent groups 
because Pakistan utilized unconventional warfare before it acquired nuclear 
weapons. He believes Pakistan remained consistent with its support of non-state 
groups, regardless of going nuclear (2006: 10). However, he bases his argument 
on that fact that Pakistan did support insurgent groups prior to going nuclear, but 
does not consider that Pakistan greatly increased its support of those groups after 
proliferating. Since acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan has undoubtedly 
increased its utilization of unconventional warfare. 
The stability-instability paradox is not specific to the relationship between 
nuclear states India and Pakistan. The US and USSR‘s actions during the Cold 
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War also demonstrated the operation of the stability-instability paradox. The Cold 
War rivals supported proxies throughout the world such as in Latin America and 
Middle East. As mentioned earlier, the proxies that the US and USSR supported 
throughout the world furthered their foreign policy goals. The Cold War was a 
period of relative stability between the US and USSR but not in areas where the 
proxies fought one another.   
The large amount of literature on nuclear deterrence theory helps explain 
why Iran and Pakistan will never use nuclear weapons on one another. The 
existing literature on the stability-instability paradox has been applied to the Cold 
War and Kargil War. However, there is no literature on how the stability-
instability paradox would operate on a nuclear-armed Iran and Pakistan. This 
topic is important due to the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and the 
fragile domestic scene in Pakistan. Studying the effect of an Iranian nuclear 
weapon on Pakistan is important because it could potentially mitigate a 
troublesome future.  
1.3 Nuclear Proliferation Debate 
 
The prevalence of nuclear weapons has created an extensive debate on 
nuclear proliferation, or the spread of nuclear weapons. One argument for nuclear 
proliferation is the establishment of strategic stability. During the Cold War, 
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strategic stability was the ―balance of strategic forces of the USSR and the US (or 
such state of the two powers‘ strategic relations) where there were no incentives 
for a first strike‖ (Arbatov 2010: 8). In other words, states obtain nuclear weapons 
to deter a nuclear attack but do not intend to launch nuclear weapons. Therefore, 
nuclear weapons remain a figurehead in their weapons arsenal, one that fulfills its 
purpose without actually ever being used.  
Other proponents of nuclear deterrence theory, such as Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita and William Riker, argue for nuclear proliferation because they believe 
nuclear deterrence limits conventional war. States conduct conventional war using 
traditional military weapons on a battlefield. Many believe that nuclear deterrence 
limits conventional war for fear of escalation to nuclear war, as also argued by the 
stability-instability paradox. For example, according to Khan, when India and 
Pakistan fought in the Kargil War in 1999, they continued hostilities ―without fear 
of escalation into a full-fledged war that could precipitate a nuclear challenge‖ 
(2003: 64).  Kenneth Waltz, a prominent supporter of both deterrence theory and 
the spread of nuclear weapons, further explains, ―Deterrent strategies lower the 
probability that they [wars] will become wars of high intensity‖ (1981). He 
projects a peaceful world in which states will acquire nuclear weapons gradually 
so that stability is maintained in the world order. Therefore, supporters of nuclear 
proliferation believe that rival states should acquire nuclear weapons in order to 
prevent war and create peace and stability. 
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Many opponents of nuclear proliferation assert that nuclear deterrence 
theory is flawed. Sagan, an opponent of nuclear proliferation and an Iranian 
bomb, describes why nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian state may be 
troubling. He argues that there are three problems with nuclear deterrence: the 
stability-instability paradox, , anti-state actors and sale of nuclear weapons. Sagan 
asserts Pakistan exhibited all three consequences after acquiring nuclear weapons 
and a nuclear-armed Iran would exhibit the same problems. As mentioned earlier, 
if Iran were to possess nuclear weapons, it would probably act more aggressively 
with its use of conventional and unconventional war. Second, Sagan mentions the 
transfer of nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists due to the vulnerability-
invulnerability paradox. The vulnerability-invulnerability paradox means that in 
the case of an attack, a state would disperse its nuclear weapons to make them less 
vulnerable. However, by changing the location of the weapons, the state is 
making the weapons vulnerable to attack by other forces, such as terrorist groups 
(Khan 2003: 68). This would lead to accidental use of nuclear weapons. Poorer 
nuclear states, such as Pakistan and North Korea, have fewer resources to devote 
to control and command systems, which are intended to secure nuclear facilities 
and so weapons are less vulnerable to attack. Sagan mentioned that Pakistan 
exemplified the vulnerability-invulnerability paradox. He cited an instance when a 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agent spoke to Taliban members about 
hiding Pakistani nuclear weapons in Afghanistan so they would be invulnerable to 
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Indian attacks (Fernandez 2011). Although this plan never materialized, it would 
have made Pakistani bombs susceptible to attack by Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or 
other terrorist organizations. Sagan believes the only solution to the vulnerability-
invulnerability paradox is technological aid from other Western nuclear powers to 
strengthen Pakistan‘s ability to protect its nuclear weapons.  
Second, Sagan discusses the threat of state actors giving away nuclear 
technology. Although the state itself may not want to share nuclear technology, a 
single individual in a nuclear state may act otherwise. Pakistani engineer AQ 
Khan is an example. In his own self interest, money and greed, he created a black 
market for nuclear weapons and allegedly sold bomb designs and centrifuges to 
Libya, Iran and North Korea and offered them to other nations such as Iraq.  He 
was willing to give certain countries nuclear technology if they had sufficient 
economic resources. The Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto denied allegations 
that he knew AQ Khan was transferring nuclear technology, which Khan later 
rebutted. The Pakistani government viewed AQ Khan as an individual actor 
giving away nuclear expertise and technology. Sagan believes that the political 
organization of a nuclear state determines whether deterrence theory will 
function. While democratic states often have a system of checks and balances, 
authoritarian states do not. An authoritarian leader may be irrational and launch a 
nuclear attack because of personal biases or fears. 
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The prevailing worldview is against the spread of nuclear weapons, and 
therefore many states participate in an extensive nonproliferation regime. One 
nonproliferation effort is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which was 
ratified in 1970 in order to control nuclear weapons proliferation and aid the 
spread of nuclear energy. Currently, 190 countries are signatories of the treaty. 
The NPT rests on three ideas (nonproliferation, disarmament and the right to 
nuclear energy) and recognizes five states with nuclear weapons, the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China. As signatories of the NPT, 
nuclear states have the obligation to disarm their own nuclear arsenal, not to 
transfer weapons, to share nuclear technology and to assist with the civilian 
nuclear energy programs of other states. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) is the organization that patrols civilian programs of nuclear energy states 
in order to ensure they are not weaponizing. All Signatories of the NPT that have 
nuclear programs must submit to IAEA inspections.   
India and Pakistan never signed the NPT and instead declared and openly 
tested their nuclear weapons. Israel also never signed the NPT, continues a 
clandestine nuclear weapons program and has never openly tested its weapons. 
North Korea signed the NPT, withdrew and finally conducted nuclear tests. Iran is 
a signatory of the NPT but is suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Because 
Iran orally threatens states such as Israel, researchers have studied the impact of 
an Iranian nuclear weapon on the Middle East, Israel and the US. However, there 
22 
 
 
 
has not yet been any work done on how an Iranian nuclear weapon would affect 
Pakistan. Because the stability-instability paradox has aptly described the 
relationship between other nuclear rivals, I chose to apply it to a nuclear-armed 
Iran and Pakistan.   
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 The purpose of this paper was to discover how an Iranian nuclear weapon 
will influence Pakistan‘s domestic stability. I researched how the stability-
instability paradox helps explain how the Saudi-Iranian proxy war will cause 
Pakistan to experience domestic instability and increased sectarian conflict once 
Iran acquires nuclear weapons. Therefore, I applied the stability-instability 
paradox to the case of a nuclear-armed Iran and Pakistan.  I hypothesize that if 
Iran possesses nuclear weapons, then Pakistan will most likely experience 
domestic instability and increased sectarian conflict. My hypothesis will be 
relevant if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.  
 In one of my previous classes, I learned how the stability-instability 
paradox operated between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India during the Kargil 
war and was curious to see how the theory would affect Pakistan once Iran 
acquire nuclear weapons. I first chose Pakistan as one of my cases because I lived 
there for several years and wanted to understand why it is becoming a dangerous 
country. Next, I wanted to study a nuclear-armed Iran because it is topical.  
Because it is probable in the future and its consequences could be grave, many 
researchers have done work on how Iran will affect the Middle East and the 
United States. However, there has not been work done on how Pakistan‘s 
domestic stability and sectarian conflict will be impacted. I think it is important to 
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study Pakistan in relation to a nuclear-armed Iran because Pakistan also has 
nuclear weapons and is an unstable country. Furthermore, a nuclear-armed Iran is 
of concern for Pakistan because it is Pakistan‘s neighbor. I also specifically chose 
these two countries because the majority of their populations belong to two 
different sects in Islam: Sunni and Shia. Historically, these sects have competed 
with one another for influence and power. Currently, Pakistan is the only Islamic 
state with nuclear weapons and may soon face a Shiite-majority nuclear-armed 
neighbor. I wanted to explore if that would be of any consequence.  
Although the Iran-Pakistan relationship appears calm, there are underlying 
issues that I wished to explore. I chose nuclear weapons as my independent 
variable because they are an important aspect of Pakistan‘s foreign policy, and 
because the relationship between two nuclear-armed states is often complicated. 
A whole field of research, nuclear theories, applies to nuclear-armed states and 
may not apply to the majority of other non-nuclear states in the world. I further 
included the Saudi-Iranian proxy war as my independent variable because it helps 
explain why sectarian tensions have increased in the Middle East. In a proxy war, 
states fund different organizations to carry out activities that are agreeable to their 
patrons. Because Pakistan is financially dependent on other states, such as Saudi 
Arabia, it has become entangled in the politics of other, more powerful states that 
have been able to maneuver Pakistan‘s policies. Sectarian conflict and domestic 
stability are my dependent variables because they seem to be getting worse every 
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day and I wanted to discover why they are worsening and whether the situation 
could become more dire. Sectarian conflict is inter-religious violence that sects 
conduct on one another. Domestic instability is instability within a country and 
can be measured by violent events and terrorist acts.  
My research was primarily qualitative. I looked at historical relations 
between Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, observed how those countries have 
molded their foreign policies and how those policies affected each other. Most 
importantly, I researched how those policies affect Pakistan. I read books and 
articles related to the underlying problems in their relationships with one another. 
Furthermore, I spoke with several Pakistani academics and researchers who have 
knowledge of Iran-Pakistan relations and nuclear weapons theories. They 
provided information that I was not able to access through CU Boulder‘s VPN. I 
incorporated a quantitative aspect into my research as well. Since I focused on 
state sponsored terrorism and conflict, I quantified some of these topics. For 
example, I explored how much money Saudi Arabia is giving to Pakistani 
religious schools, how many sectarian terrorist acts have occurred in Pakistan and 
whether there is a correlation between the two. In addition, I looked at the growth 
of madrassas by school of thought.  
One of the largest obstacles I faced in this research was lack of 
information. Many of the topics that I researched are classified and underground, 
and as a result, official data are not readily available. Furthermore, many websites 
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relating to my topic were in either Urdu or Farsi. If I knew how to read these 
languages, I would have been able to understand more about certain organizations 
and their links to the problem of sectarianism in Pakistan. Various websites have 
posted different statistics and facts, and I tried to quote information that have been 
cited by several sources and the most credible sources. As a student, I was not 
able to do extensive field research and speak with people involved with my topic. 
However, I tried to creatively read scholarly works and include the most relevant 
information. Therefore, my work has been primarily drawn from the work of 
Middle East analysts and nuclear theory experts, such as Vali Nasr and Pervez 
Hoodbhoy. Recent news articles were an excellent source of information. For 
example, Dawn News, a credible newspaper was an excellent source of 
information from a Pakistani perspective. I was especially able to measure strains 
in relationship between Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia through news articles and 
WikiLeaks.  
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Chapter 3: A Political History of Pakistan  
 Pakistan‘s history is filled with instances of corruption, assassinations, 
military rule, economic problems and a slow transition to Islamization. Its history 
has ties with India, Iran and Saudi Arabia but due to the policies of some 
Pakistani politicians, Pakistan is drifting away from its cultural roots and instead 
moving closer to its religious roots.  
Present day Pakistan is in the area known as the Indus Valley, which 
extends from the western borders of Iran to the eastern border of India. However, 
the Indus Valley civilization no longer existed after 1700 BC and the cause is 
unknown today. In 522 BC, the Persian Emperor Darius II invaded the provinces 
of Punjab and Sindh, and these areas remained under Persian control for the next 
200 years. Consequently, the Persian language became highly entrenched in Sindh 
and Punjab (current day Pakistan‘s two most populated provinces). Persian 
became the official and cultural language of the empire, ranging from the 
government, to literature and education (The Urdu Language).  
Led by General Muhammad bin Qasim, Arabs finally invaded the 
province of Sindh in 712 AD, and consequently were able to retain control for the 
next three centuries. Most notably, the Arabs brought Islam to the area and the 
religion persists to the present day. The next conquers, the Mughals, were Muslim 
descendents of Genghis Khan but were also Persianized (Canfield 1991: 20). 
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They arrived in the 16
th
 century and controlled the subcontinent for the next 200 
years. Urdu was their official language and it continues to be the national 
language of Pakistan today. Urdu is derived from Arabic, Persian, Turkish and 
Hindi (Dawn 2011). The influence of the Persian conquest in the subcontinent 
heavily impacted the Urdu language. The Urdu vocabulary consists of 70% 
Persian or Farsi words but is also influenced by Arabic.  
 After the fall of the Mughal Empire, several different empires ruled until 
the most notable, the British Empire. Eventually, the British left and the 
subcontinent was partitioned between the agricultural north, which was to form 
present day Pakistan, and the industrial south, which was to be India. Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, created the ―two nation theory‖ in which he 
asserted that Muslims needed a separate homeland. Consequently, Muslims, 
Hindus and Sikhs migrated after the division of the subcontinent. Dubbed 
Pakistan, meaning ―the land of the pure,‖ the new country was intended to be a 
secular nation based on the principle of ―one nation, one culture, and one 
language‖ (Amin 1993: 73). Jinnah was neither an Islamic fundamentalist nor a 
complete secularist. His speeches often referenced Islam but he was also tolerant 
of other religions. In one of his speeches, he explained,  
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go 
to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of 
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that 
has nothing to do with the business of the state (Debates 1947).  
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The Pakistani flag that was created under Jinnah‘s supervision is divided in order 
to symbolize Pakistan‘s diversity. Two-thirds of the flag is green and contains and 
crescent and star in honor of the majority Muslims. The white third is in honor of 
the minorities (Irfani 2009). Finally, Jinnah died in 1948 just a year after the birth 
of Pakistan, and unfortunately, his pan-Islamic dream did not last. Many 
Pakistanis believe that if Jinnah had lived longer, the population would be more 
unified nationalistically today.  
Next, Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah‘s ―right hand man‖ took power (Ahmed 
1997: 190). During his rule, the national identity of Pakistan became an intangible 
concept as tribes, villages and dynastic families retained their feudal power and 
caused people to give their allegiance to their tribes first. Consequently, Pakistan 
had difficulty forming a singular identity (Jaffrelot 2002:  4).  Furthermore, the 
Indo-Pak War of 1947 (or the First Kashmir War) and the 1948 Balochistan 
conflict occurred during Liaquat Ali Khan‘s administration. He was finally 
assassinated in 1951.  
After martial law was declared, General Ayub Khan came into power 
through a military coup d‘état in 1956. Ayub Khan is remembered as a man who 
modernized Pakistan and improved its image internationally. In addition, he 
created a new constitution that did not declare Islam the state religion and thus 
continued Jinnah‘s religiously inclusive dream. He fought for and instituted a 
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―progressive-liberal and modernist version of Islam‖ (Ansari 2011: 45, Jaffrelot 
2002: 71).  
When Ayub Khan stepped down, Yahya Khan took power in 1969 and he 
declared a second period of martial law. It was under Yahya Khan‘s rule that East 
Pakistan separated and became the independent country of Bangladesh in a 
bloody war. In dealing with the Bengali separation movement, Khan invoked 
Islamic rhetoric in his speeches and asserted that Bengali Muslims were Hindus in 
disguise (Khan 1985: 837). The war and consequent loss of East Pakistan caused 
Khan to resign in 1971. Many Pakistanis felt that the military‘s secularism was 
why they lost East Pakistan (Nasr 2001: 78).  
Consequently under the next the civilian ruler, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
Pakistan became more Islamic. Due to the military‘s loss of East Pakistan, the 
military also became more open to Islam. An expert on Pakistan and State 
Department Scholar on the Muslim World Vali Reza Nasr explains,  
The loss of East Pakistan, in effect, created a crisis of identity for 
Pakistan. As a result, the population turned to Islam for answers. 
This opened the door for Islamists and traditional religious 
institutions to become more directly involved in politics (2001: 
78).  
 
A new constitution was formed in 1973 that was more open to Islam, as opposed 
to Ayub Khan‘s liberal constitution. The new constitution made Islam the state 
religion for the first time in Pakistan‘s history and initiated a program of Islamic 
education in schools.  Islamiyat, or Islamic studies, was now mandatory in 
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schools. Non-Muslims could no longer be president or prime minister. Bhutto 
adopted Islamic socialism and made his slogan ―Clothes, food and shelter‖ (Nasr 
2001: 76). Due to pressure exerted by religious parties, Bhutto declared Ahmedis 
(a sect of Islam) non-Muslims. Furthermore, the Pakistan National Alliance 
(PNA), an anti-Bhutto party coalition, threatened to overthrow him if he did not 
institute law favorable to Islam, and consequently, he yielded to their demands of 
instituting religion and as a result, made gambling illegal, declared Fridays a 
weekly holiday and banned the sale and consumption of alcohol. Already, 
religious groups were gaining their foothold to political power and Jinnah‘s 
Pakistan was moving further away from what he envisioned. In 1977, the PNA 
led a coup against Bhutto after which he was arrested, tried and executed. Finally 
Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law and came into power.  
Zia-ul-Haq, a military ruler, de-socialized Pakistan and turned it towards 
capitalism. Encouraged by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, he Islamized Pakistan. 
Although Pakistan had a tradition of practicing Islam through a tolerant school of 
thought called Sufism (Islamic mysticism), Zia instituted the Deobandi school of 
thought, which is similar to the strict Wahhabi Islam (a conservative Sunni 
interpretation of Islam), found in Saudi Arabia. By encouraging Deobandi Islam, 
Zia converted many moderate Pakistani Sunnis into conservative Deobandis. He 
incorporated Islamic laws, created Islamic courts, introduced a blasphemy law in 
Pakistan (the first time in its history) and instituted laws against minorities. He 
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received support from Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), or ―Islamic Party,‖ a rightist party 
promoting an Islamic state with Sharia law.  
They [Jamaat-i-Islami] wanted to first bring about a revolution in 
the thinking of Pakistanis and then achieve political power. 
Their… hope was that they would be carried home to power of the 
shoulders of an ‗adherent.‘ Their time seemed to have come. Zia 
seemed to fit the role perfectly (Abbas 2005: 101).  
 
Zia gave JI special privileges. For example, he banned all political parties and 
censored the media, but JI was immune from these laws. Moreover, Zia changed 
Jinnah‘s ―Unity, Faith, Discipline‖ motto for the army to ―Faith, Obedience of 
God, Struggle in the path of Allah.‖ The army not only had to protect Pakistan, 
but also Pakistan‘s ―ideological frontiers‖ (Rizvi 1986: 242). Clearly, Zia‘s 
attempts at Islamization were not how Jinnah envisioned Pakistan.  
Zia‘s reform of the education system also changed the secular nature of 
Pakistan. He allowed the ulema, or Muslim scholars, to control the new madrassa 
system. Most of the ulema were Deobandi Muslims and hoped madrassas would 
produce fundamentalist students. Furthermore, Zia used money from a 
compulsory zakat (charity) tax money to fund madrassas. Pakistani political 
analyst and researcher Hassan Abbas states,  
This was the first formal recognition of the Madrassa network by 
the government. With financial infusion and official 
encouragement, this was to grow exponentially, and in time it was 
to become the nursery, and then the assembly line that would churn 
out tens of thousands of radicalized young men (2005: 107-108).  
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In addition to radicalizing how Pakistanis traditionally practiced Islam, Zia‘s 
Islamic laws created sectarian divisions among the population. During his rule, he 
also allied with the US in its Cold War against the USSR. Pakistan helped train 
the Sunni Afghan mujahideen (holy warriors) and this group eventually became a 
destabilizing factor in Pakistan‘s future. The war created hardliner Sunni militants 
and caused there to be an influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. In 1988, Zia 
died in a plane crash, which is believed to be an assassination. Zia‘s Islamization 
policies and support of Afghan mujahideen are widely blamed for radical 
sectarianism in Pakistan today.   
After the decade rule of Zia, Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, was elected as leader. Because Zia had begun a tradition of Sunnization in 
Pakistan, the Shia Benazir Bhutto would dress herself like a Sunni woman (Nasr 
2006: 82). A failing economy and national security concerns eventually caused 
her dismissal. The next leader, Nawaz Sharif, came to power in 1990. With 
economic and institutional problems, Sharif resigned and Bhutto returned to 
power. During her administration, the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), was cleansed of Islamists. Relations with the 
international community improved. Notably, it was during Benazir Bhutto‘s time 
that the Taliban, which consisted of Afghans trained by Pakistan, funded by Saudi 
Arabia and encouraged by the US, took control over Afghanistan. Students from 
Pakistani madrassas also joined in the effort (Abbas 2005: 55). Benazir Bhutto 
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continued to support the Taliban, as she believed they would stabilize 
Afghanistan. Extremist Sunni organizations such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan 
(SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) and Tehrik-e- Nifaj-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
(TNSM) approved her support of the Taliban. In 1994, the Taliban expanded to 
the northwest of Pakistan and imposed Islamic law. It was not until 2007 that 
Bhutto repealed her support of the Taliban. After having been accused of 
corruption, her time in office ended and Nawaz Sharif returned to power after 
popular elections.  
Under Nawaz Sharif‘s time in office, Pakistan successfully detonated its 
first nuclear bomb on May 28, 1998. As a result, relations with the international 
community deteriorated and the economy took a turn for the worse as sanctions 
were imposed upon Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan and India fought in the 1999 
Kargil War, after which Nawaz Sharif‘s popularity collapsed. In a military coup, 
General Pervez Musharraf took power in 1999. Islamic groups welcomed 
Musharraf, thinking he would be favorable to their cause as Zia had been. 
Musharraf planned to recover the country‘s morale, improve the economy, and 
remove corruption in Pakistani politics. He liberalized the economy and it 
improved drastically. Musharraf wanted to reform the blasphemy law, but was not 
able to do so because of pressure from religious groups. He suppressed the 
sectarian problem because he put radical Sunni and Shiite political parties on 
watch. He was able to halt their activity for the time being, but it would resume in 
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the years to come. In November 2007, he declared a state of emergency that lasted 
for a month. In the following year, Musharraf resigned and ended his nine years in 
office.  
Subsequently, Bhutto‘s husband Asif Ali Zardari was elected in 2008. In 
conjunction with the US, the Pakistani army marched to the northwest of Pakistan 
to remove the Taliban. Relations with the US worsened when Americans 
conducted a mission in Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden, the head of the Al-
Qaeda. The highest number of sectarian motivated terrorist acts has marked his 
term. Evidently, Pakistani politics have experienced a tumultuous history of 
assassinations, martial law and a path towards Islamization.  
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Chapter 4: History of Pakistan and Iran‘s Nuclear 
Weapons Program 
4.1 Pakistan‘s Nuclear Weapons Program 
 
After India‘s first nuclear tests in 1974, the Pakistani prime minister, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, made Pakistan‘s nuclear ambitions clear by asserting that 
―even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb‖ (Epstein 1977: 19).  
Pakistanis viewed nuclear weapons as a solution to their unstable relationship 
with India and sought them for deterrence purposes. Henry Kissinger, US 
Secretary of State during Nixon‘s administration, attempted to dissuade Pakistan 
from building nuclear capability by offering to develop its conventional weapons 
(Abbas 2005: 84). Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India 
experienced a tumultuous, mistrusting and competitive relationship. India was 
more industrialized, economically powerful and had a stronger military than 
agriculture-based Pakistan. The two neighbors fought wars in 1947 and 1965 over 
Kashmir and in 1971 over East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) and 
consequently, Pakistan was constantly reminded of its conventional inferiority. 
After the 1971 defeat by India, Pakistan was determined to acquire nuclear 
weapons. Therefore, Pakistan‘s primary purpose for acquiring nuclear weapons 
was as a deterrent against India‘s nuclear weapons and its conventional warfare 
superiority.  
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Throughout the 1980s under Zia‘s rule, Pakistan pursued a strategy of 
nuclear ambiguity, but secretly developed a nuclear weapons program. Several of 
Zia‘s attempts at diplomacy failed. India did not pursue Zia‘s proposed no-war 
pact and nuclear-free South Asia (Abbas 2005: 118). Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons 
program came in to existence largely because of the efforts of nuclear scientist 
named Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan) who worked in a laboratory in Holland 
and illegally imported nuclear technology into Pakistan in 1975. Pakistan changed 
its course of nuclear ambiguity when India began a series of aggressive nuclear 
tests (Ahmed 1991: 178). In May 1998, Pakistan detonated its first nuclear bomb 
and the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif was quoted saying, ―No matter [if] we are 
recognized as a nuclear weapons power or not, we are a nuclear power‖ (The 
News). Consequently, Pakistan officially became a member of the nuclear club, 
joining the confirmed nuclear states. By developing nuclear weapons, Pakistan 
defied the West and these weapons gave the country security, prestige and a sense 
of nationalism. Although Pakistan has not signed the NPT, it has adhered to 
international standards of safety of its nuclear assets. A secure command and 
control system, aided by Western efforts, can alleviate most concerns about 
terrorists taking over nuclear facilities.   
 Because Pakistan is the only state Islamic state with nuclear arms, many 
have labeled its nuclear weapon the ―Islamic bomb.‖ When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
initiated Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program, he meant it as a deterrent against 
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India‘s nuclear weapons and for Pakistan‘s international prestige. However, he 
argued that,  
We know that Israel and South Africa have full capability. The 
Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The 
communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization 
was without it, but that position was about to change (1979: 138).  
 
The Pakistani nuclear weapon was never intended to be the protectorate of the 
Muslim world and currently does not serve as a nuclear umbrella for other Islamic 
states. Regardless, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto used the the label ―Islamic bomb‖ in order 
to solicit funding from Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, who funded about 60% 
of the program (Borger 2010). Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran 
welcome a nuclear Pakistan.  
4.2 Iran‘s Nuclear Program 
 
The secular monarch Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi began the Iranian 
civilian nuclear program in 1957 when Iran signed a bilateral deal with the US to 
import enriched uranium and build research reactors under the US ―Atoms for 
Peace‖ program. Next, Iran signed the NPT in 1968. Although Iran argued their 
nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, when the Shah was asked about 
nuclear weapons ambitions, he replied that Iran would get nuclear weapons 
―certainly, and sooner than one would think‖ (Interview with Shah 1974: 2). 
When the Iranian Revolution occurred in 1979, most of Iran‘s nuclear reactors 
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were under construction and not yet complete. Consequently, with turmoil in the 
country, many international firms left Iran and so their projects were 
uncompleted. In addition, the religious leader of the Islamic Nation of Iran, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa, or religious decree, against nuclear weapons 
because he believed they run counter to Islamic teachings (Eisenstadt and Khalaji 
2011: 2). As a result, many Iranian nuclear scientists and students left the country 
and the Iranian nuclear program came to a standstill.  
The Iran-Iraq war years changed the fate of Iran‘s nuclear program 
because Iraq utilized chemical weapons and Western powers did not come to 
Iran‘s aid. Iraq destroyed unfinished reactors in Iran and consequently Iran‘s 
nuclear infrastructure was severely damaged. It is important to note that allegedly, 
it was during the Iran-Iraq War that AQ Khan first began talks with Iran to sell 
nuclear bomb secrets. In retaliation to Iraq‘s missile attacks on Iran, Iran began to 
purse missile capability. After the war, Iran decided to restart its nuclear program 
and appealed to Western nations for aid, but with no avail. Consequently, during 
the early 1990s, Iran signed agreements under the IAEA with China and Russia 
who both agreed to help repair damaged Iranian infrastructure and provide 
materials.  
In 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed the 
existence of two other nuclear enrichment facilities at Arak and Natanz which 
were never disclosed to the IAEA, international concerns about a covert nuclear 
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weapons program heightened. Iran consequently invited the IAEA to come and 
inspect their nuclear facilities but even after several visits, the IAEA was not 
satisfied (Chubin and Litwak 2003: 100). They argued that Iran was not fully 
cooperating with IAEA requests. As a result, in 2003, Iran agreed to halt uranium 
enrichment and most importantly, signed the Additional Protocol, which would 
allow the IAEA to conduct rigorous searches into Iranian facilities. Nonetheless, 
Iran did not ratify the Additional Protocol and hopes for Iran halting uranium 
enrichment were destroyed. To further exacerbate the situation, in 2004, the IAEA 
had noted similarities between Iranian and Libyan nuclear technologies. Since AQ 
Khan had already admitted selling nuclear technology to Libya, the IAEA‘s 
revelation confirmed that AQ Khan also provided secrets to Iran. Once again, the 
IAEA criticized Iran for its lack of cooperation and disclosure of foreign aid with 
its nuclear program. Finally, in 2004, Iran declared it would continue its nuclear 
program and enrich uranium (Nikou 2011). Although Iran remains a signatory of 
the NPT and has not produced a nuclear bomb, the international community is 
dismayed at Iran‘s lack of adherence to treaties, its continued concealment of 
information and lack of full cooperation. Further complicating an Iranian nuclear 
weapons threat is the fact that Iran is developing missiles and more shockingly, 
long range missiles. However, Iranian scientists claim these missiles cannot carry 
nuclear warheads and do not signal an impending missile with a nuclear head 
(Bahgat 2006: 312). 
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Despite troubles with the IAEA, Iran did not violate the NPT. 
Furthermore, according to the 2003 IAEA report, it was ―doubtful‖ that Iran had 
all the materials required for the construction of a nuclear weapon (Chubin and 
Litwak: 101). Despite this fact, for decades, countries such as the United States 
and Israel have been postulating that Iran is only years or months away from 
developing a nuclear bomb. However, predictions of an Iranian bomb have not yet 
come true. Therefore, Western media often portrays Iran as an anti-Western state 
because of the current regime‘s foreign policies and nuclear aspirations. However, 
Iran has been pursuing nuclear technology since Shah‘s regime, when US-Iranian 
relations were friendly.  
Those who believe Iran is pursuing a military nuclear program argue 
current advancements in the nuclear program are not necessary for energy 
purposes and signal production of a nuclear weapon. In addition, given Iran‘s 
large amounts of oil and gas reserves, the country does not need additional energy 
sources. Moreover, critics remain suspicious because Iran previously did not fully 
disclose all information regarding its nuclear program to the IAEA and still may 
be hiding information about a military program. Those that believe Iran is not 
going to acquire nuclear weapons assert that Iran is a signatory of the NPT, 
reassert Iran‘s right to nuclear energy, and cite Ayatollah Khomeini‘s religious 
fatwa. Regardless of the debate around its intentions, Iran is still a signatory of the 
NPT and continues to declare that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. 
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The future will tell if Iran is acquiring nuclear weapons. Until then, the 
international community should prepare for a world order in which Iran does have 
nuclear weapons.   
Most states do not want to accept an Iranian bomb. States that are 
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization committed to 
preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, have placed economic sanctions on Iran 
because they were alarmed by IAEA reports and developments in Iran‘s nuclear 
program.  Muhammed El Baredei, the IAEA director, relates that, 
From what we repeatedly observed, a policy of isolation and 
sanctions only served to stimulate a country‘s sense of pride; in the 
worst case, it could make the targeted country‘s nuclear project a 
matter of national priority (El Baradei 2006: 86).  
 
Regardless, many question whether Iran will actually suspend its nuclear 
program, cave under economic sanctions and give in to international pressures. 
Bahgat argues that scenario is unlikely because the amount of financial and 
human capital and national prestige Iran has invested into its program. Iran is 
continuing with its nuclear program despite sanctions that are negatively affecting 
its population. Although Iran relies heavily on imported materials to develop its 
nuclear program, it has at the same time built up a local expertise and has the 
resources to continue a nuclear program (Bahgat 2006: 308). 
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Chapter 5 : Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Relations 
5.1 Iran-Pakistan Relations 
 
Pakistan‘s relations with Iran are often described as ―shaky.‖ As Pakistan 
moves closer to certain allies such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan‘s shared 
historical roots are often forgotten. On the surface, relations appear calm because 
they maintain diplomatic ties and cooperate economically and politically. 
However, Iran and Pakistan‘s use of proxies in other countries reveal that they 
often support opposite sides of a conflict.  
As mentioned earlier, Pakistan‘s official language, Urdu, is heavily 
influenced by the Persian language due to historic Persian conquests. The 
conquests led to the existence of a Persianized form of Islam in South Asia from 
the 13
th
 to 19
th
 centuries. Rulers, such as the Mughals, were also Persianized and 
consequently the official language of the land was Persian. According to the 
Pakistani author Mujtaba Razvi, ―Next to Islam, the Iranian cultural tradition 
exercised perhaps the most decisive and penetrating influence in fashioning the 
Muslim socio-cultural ethos in Pakistan‖ (1971: 204). While both Iran and 
Pakistan are Muslim majority states, Pakistan has a Sunni majority while Iran has 
a Shiite majority, and Shiite Islam has been the official state religion of Iran since 
1501 (Fürtig 2002: 35). As the Pakistani-American political scientist Dr. Shirin R. 
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Tahir-Kehli argues ―the closeness of Iranian-Pakistani ties can be traced … to the 
common bonds of religion, language, and culture‖ (1977: 489).  
Pakistan-Iran relations started friendly. Iran was the first state to recognize 
the independent country of Pakistan in August 1947. Jinnah realized the 
importance of maintaing friendly relations with Pakistan‘s western neighbor and 
thus began a friendship built on mutual respect. In 1950, Pakistan performed its 
national anthem the first time ever in its history in front of the Shah of Iran (Irfani 
2009). Pakistan and Iran were both members of the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO), which was an alliance of cooperation and protection aimed at 
countering Soviet influence in Central and South Asia. In 1964, Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey formed the Regional Cooperation and Development (RDC) scheme for the 
purposes of creating economic and cultural ties. In 1965, Iran backed Pakistan in 
its fight with India for Kashmir and declared that Pakistan had been a victim of 
aggression (Mujtaba 1971: 211) India asserts that Iran aided Pakistan by giving it 
free oil. During the war, Iran also provided medical aid and ammunition to 
Pakistan and was considering an embargo on India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was noted 
saying,  
It is a debt we owe to the Iranian nation, and as a fraternal country, 
we shall remember for ever the generous and warm appreciation of 
righteous cause that Iran manifested in concrete, unmistakable and 
tangible terms (Mujtaba 1971: 212).  
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Thus in the early years of Pakistan, Iran proved to be an invaluable ally, 
dependable in times of need.  
Although, many positive developments occurred in the Pakistan-Iran 
relationship during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto‘s time in office, once Zia became 
president, trends changed for the worse. As a religious man, Zia welcomed the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Iranian secular monarchy. Pakistan 
became the first country to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran, following its 
revolution. The revolution‘s slogan was ―Neither Oriental nor Occidental - 
Islamic and only Islamic – neither Shia nor Sunni – Islamic and only Islamic.‖ Zia 
and Ayatollah Ruhollah Imam Khomeini (the Iranian religious leader) formed 
diplomatic ties based on Islam but did not have friendly relations, mostly caused 
by ideological differences. For example, Zia ignored Khomeini‘s pleas to not 
execute the Shia Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Furthermore, ―Khomeini's religious rhetoric 
sparked radicalism across the sectarian divide [in Pakistan]‖ (Pant 2009). 
Furthermore, he issued a fatwa (religious decree) declaring that Iran must protect 
the Shiites of Pakistan (Vatanka 2012). The Iranian Islamic Revolution had 
additional consequences for Pakistan, which I will later discuss.  
Events transpiring after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put a sore spot 
on the Pakistan-Iran relationship. During the Soviet-Afghan war, Iran and 
Pakistan supported rival sides of the war and thus engaged in an unconventional 
war. Pakistan allied with Saudi Arabia and the US, and aided the Afghan 
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insurgency, called the Taliban. Because the Taliban is an extremist Sunni 
organization, it massacred Hazara Shiites in Afghanistan and consequently, Iran 
supported the opposing faction, the Afghan Northern Alliance. When the Soviets 
withdrew from Afghanistan, both Iran and Pakistan aided with its stabilization 
and wanted to stay involved in order to retain their spheres of influence within the 
country and influence the new government. Post-Soviet Afghanistan is a time in 
history where Pakistan and Iran engaged in a proxy war (Haqqani 2005, 
Christensen 2011: 7). Iran influenced the education, social life and economics of 
the western region, which used to be part of its territory. Pakistan supported the 
Taliban as the new Afghan government and this severely weakened the Pakistan-
Iran relationship. Rival Iran realized that ―Pakistan‘s long desired goal of gaining 
‗strategic depth‘ was sought to be attained through a favorable Taliban 
government in Afghanistan‖ (Alam 2004: 533). As Pakistan and the US continued 
to support the Taliban government, Iran countered their efforts by aiding the 
Northern Alliance and Shiite organizations.   
In the 1998 Battle of Mazar-e-Sharif, the Pakistan-backed Taliban and 
Iran-backed Northern Alliance fought for control of the Afghan capital, Kabul. 
The result was seven Iranian diplomats dead and eight thousand Shiite Hazaras 
massacred (BBC 2001). After this incident, sectarian conflict soared in Pakistan 
in which ―hundreds of Pakistani Shias, including Iranian diplomats and Iranian 
nationals, were killed‖ (Alam 2004: 533). Notably, the Mazar-e-Sharif incident 
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brought Pakistan and Iran close to war. Christensen argues that the likelihood of 
Iran and Pakistan finding a solution to Afghanistan is very unlikely and will 
continue to strain their relations in the future (2011: 54). He also believes that Iran 
is specifically trying to promote state supported terrorist groups and Shiism 
(2011: 18). For example, in 2009, the Afghan government discovered Iranian 
textbooks that encouraged Shiism and defamed Sunnism (Daily Times 2009). 
While Afghan Shiites viewed this move as prejudicial, Afghan Sunnis viewed this 
move as Iran attempting to incite sectarianism.  
In another incident years later, a missile hit the United Nations office in 
Islamabad in the beginning of Musharraf‘s administration. The director of the ISI, 
Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed was given information that the Iranian 
government had supported the Afghanistan Northern Alliance in carrying out the 
attack. Consequently, Musharraf‘s planned trip to Iran was postponed. Once he 
finally did meet with Iranian leadership, they declared Iran had no role in the 
incident and talked about Pakistan‘s support of the Taliban. Musharraf then re-
assessed its pro-Taliban policy and eventually ceased support to the Taliban 
(Abbas 2005: 184).  
Another problem in the Iranian-Pakistan relationship is caused by the 
Baloch tribes. Estimated around nine million they live near the borders of 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. They are ―linguistically, ethnically, culturally and 
traditionally alike‖ (Khan 2012: 121). In August 2004, Pakistani and Iranian 
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officials signed an agreement stating that the province of Balochistan in Pakistan 
and the province of Seistan Balochistan in Iran would be Twin Provinces. The 
agreement created future cultural, religious, social and economic exchanges 
between the two provinces. Despite this step forward, the two Baloch provinces 
experienced problems such as drug trafficking and border clashes. On October 19, 
2009 forty members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard died in an alleged 
Jundallah attack after which Iran threatened to close the border with Pakistan 
(Pakistan Defense 2010). Jundallah, also known as the People‘s Resistance 
Movement of Iran, is a terrorist organization supposedly supported by Pakistan 
that is accused of stirring Sunni and Balochi resistance in Iran (Vesely 2009: 24). 
They allege to have no separatist motives and instead want equality with Iranian 
Shiites. In a move of building trust with Iran, Pakistan arrested the head of 
Jundallah and gave him to Iranian authorities in early 2010 (Black 2010). 
Furthermore, in order to bring the proposed Pipeline Project (discussed later) into 
existence, Pakistan and Iran suppress their Baloch population to stabilize their 
respective Baloch provinces.  
Sectarianism is one of the worst aspects of Pakistan-Iran relationship. 
Hazaras are an ethnically Persian group living in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. 
Pakistan and Iran experienced an influx of Hazara immigrants during a 1978 
Afghan revolution. Due to their Shiite heritage, Pakistani Hazaras frequently visit 
Iran for cultural, education and religious purposes (Khan 2012: 135). Since 1999, 
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Pakistani Sunni extremist groups have massacred the Hazara community in 
Balochistan. The Pakistani government has failed to take any action against the 
groups conducting the killings and the Iranian government condemns the attacks. 
Many scholars believe that the Iranian Islamic Revolution instigated sectarian 
conflict in Pakistan, and since Pakistani Shiites and Iranians have been victims of 
the Sunni majority. In 1991, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Sunni militant organization 
murdered Iranian diplomat, Sadiq Ganji, in Pakistan for sectarian reasons. Rasul 
Bakhsh Rais, a political science professor at Lahore University of Management 
Sciences, asserts that,  
This is sectarian. Sunni organizations contend on challenging 
Iranian influence in Pakistan would like to open up another front in 
Iran, which has been untouched by the sectarianism that is 
affecting Pakistan. The regional implications are going to be very 
serious for Pakistan. Pakistan-Iranian relations are likely to 
deteriorate. Iran is likely to encourage the sectarian aspect in 
Pakistan (Montero 2007).  
 
Furthermore, many believe that Iran will not give up on the Pakistani Shias.  
The rise of nationalism in Balochistan in Iran and Pakistan is a major 
impediment to the proposed Pakistan-Iran Pipeline Project. Because Iran has large 
natural gas resources, it wants to strengthen economic ties with neighboring 
countries and export its raw gas. The idea was first agreed upon in 1995 and since 
then, different countries such as India, Bangladesh, and China, have all been 
invited to participate in the project. Nevertheless, the US has threatened Pakistan 
and India with economic sanctions in order to coerce them to withdraw from the 
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deal and consequently, India withdrew in 2009 (Hussain 2013). The US believes 
it is necessary for states to refrain from forming economic ties with Iran because 
Iran is proceeding with its nuclear program. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has also 
offered Pakistan an ―alternative package‖ in which it would supply Pakistan with 
loans and oil (Dawn 2010). Due to its energy shortages, Pakistan has decided to 
not give in to international pressure and is proceeding with the deal. The current 
president of Pakistan asserted that ―Pakistan is our priority and all our friends 
should understand that we do things for national interest and not for any other 
reason. All we want is peace and all we want is an economic growth in Pakistan‖ 
(RFRL 2013). As of March 5, 2013, the Pipeline Project is set to go forth  despite 
US demands.  
 Clearly, Saudi Arabia and the US do not want Pakistan to cooperate with 
Iran because of the advancements in Iran‘s nuclear program. Pakistan believes 
that Iran has the right to acquire nuclear energy but should not weaponize. In 
2006, Pakistani officials held talks with Iranians in order to advise them against 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Pakistan‘s Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri has been 
especially vocal in his condemnations of an Iranian nuclear weapon. According to 
Dawn News, Kasuri ―made it his mission to persuade Tehran not to provoke a 
conflict over Iran‘s nuclear program thus endangering regional - and Pakistan‘s 
domestic - security‖ and also asserted that ―We [Pakistan] are the only Muslim 
country [with such weapons] and don‘t want anyone else to get it‖ (Sattar 2011). 
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Furthermore, Musharraf has also attempted to dissuade Iran from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. Clearly, Pakistani officials have realized that gravity of an 
Iranian nuclear weapon.   
The main source of agreement between Iran and Pakistan is that they are 
both Islamic nations, regardless of which sect they belong. When Pakistan 
successfully tested a nuclear bomb, Iran‘s foreign minister visited Pakistan and 
offered his congratulations. He explained, ―Now, they (Muslims) feel confident, 
because a fellow Islamic nation possesses the knowhow to build nuclear 
weapons‖ (Alam 2004: 534). Iran and Pakistan have signed several agreements 
such as Bilateral Trade Agreement; Bilateral Agreement on Cooperation in Plant 
Protection and Quarantine; Joint Economic Commission and Defense 
Cooperation, Preferential Trade Agreement and most recently, the Joint 
Ministerial Commission on Security. It is clear that although Iran and Pakistan are 
cooperating on matters such as trade, contentions regarding nationalism, 
suppression, state-sponsored terrorist groups and sectarian differences still exist. 
5.2 Saudi-Pakistani Relations 
 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are both Sunni Muslim majority countries. 
Saudi Arabia prescribes to the Wahhabi interpretation of Sunni Islam, which that 
has impacted the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan. Wahhabism is an ultra-
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conservative interpretation of Islam and follows Qur‘anic teachings strictly. Due 
to their Islamic ties, Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to recognize 
Pakistan‘s independence. In the capital of Pakistan stands Faisal Mosque, in 
honor of Saudi Arabia‘s King Faisal. In addition, the Pakistani city of Lyllapur 
was renamed Faisalabad for King Faisal. Their friendly ties are due to one‘s 
superior military and the other‘s abundant resources. 
The relatively weak Saudi military benefits from the skilled Pakistani 
military. Every year, Saudi Naval and Special Forces travel to Pakistan to conduct 
combined trainings with the Pakistani army.  The development of ―a military 
relationship with Saudi Arabia offered Pakistan not only economic benefits and 
military material assistance, but, equally important, it gave Pakistan a 
psychological shift towards its Islamic roots‖ (Staudenmaier, Tahir-Kheli 1981: 
8). The Pakistani military also has protected Saudi Arabia. For example, in 1969, 
when Yemeni insurgents attacked Saudi Arabia, Pakistani forces were the ones to 
crush the invasion. Following the attack, about 15,000 Pakistani soldiers came to 
Saudi Arabia‘s aid during the 1970s and 1980s. They were stationed in Saudi 
Arabia in order to guard the border from Yemeni invasion and to train the Saudi 
military. When the Iran-Iraq War occurred, Saudi Arabia kept Pakistani troops on 
standby in case the war spilled over into Saudi Arabia‘s territory or if Iraq lost the 
war (Dunningan 2012). Furthermore, during the Gulf Wars, Pakistan sent military 
personnel to Saudi Arabia in order to protect the Islamic holy sites. Saudi Arabia 
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has specifically asked the Pakistani military to supply Bahrain with soldiers and 
police if a Shiite uprising ever occurred. As a result, Pakistan supplied up to two 
thousand people to Bahrain and they now make up about thirty percent of 
Bahrain‘s security forces (Mashal 2011). Bahrain‘s Sunni monarchy invites 
foreign Sunni soldiers in order to provide security for the Shiite majority.  
Saudi Arabia has consistently provided diplomatic and financial support to 
Pakistan. According to the Brookings Institute, out of all the Arab countries, 
Saudi Arabia has given the greatest aid to Pakistan since the 1950s (Riedel 2008). 
Saudi Arabia funded Pakistan‘s support of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the 
1980s. Throughout the 1965 Indian-Pakistani fight over Kashmir, Saudi Arabia 
gave financial support to Pakistan. ―In 1976 alone, aid [to Pakistan] amounted to 
over $500 million or 24.8 percent of total Saudi aid‖ (Staudenmaier, Tahir-Kheli 
1981: 3). Currently, Pakistan receives the largest amount of remittances from 
nationals residing in Saudi Arabia, and these remittances are a great economic 
relief to the struggling Pakistani economy. Saudi Arabia also provides special oil 
prices to Pakistan. Several newspapers, such as the Saudi Gazette, refer to Saudi 
Arabia being a ―second home for Pakistanis‖ (2012). Although Pakistan is not a 
member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia facilitated a free 
trade agreement between the GCC and Pakistan. It has also given Pakistan 
support during crises such as the 2010 floods.  
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Saudi Arabia gives Pakistan aid for religious and educational purposes. 
When the Iranian Revolution occurred, Zia Islamized Pakistan and Saudi-
Pakistani relations improved extensively. In order to counter Iranian and Shiite 
influence in Pakistan, Zia allied with Sunni fundamentalists after which Deobandi 
madrassas received funding from Saudi charities. A Wikileak revealed that 
Pakistani madrassas may have been receiving as much as $100 million dollars 
every year through charitable Islamic organizations operating as missionaries 
(Dawn 2008). Most significantly, the Saudi government still builds mosques and 
funds madrassas, which in turn foster a conservative interpretation of Islam in 
Pakistan.  
When Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, Saudi Arabia openly approved. 
Due to international economic sanctions on Pakistan, Saudi Arabia gave $5 billion 
worth of oil as a present to Pakistan, and the Saudi support allowed Pakistan to 
continue with its nuclear weapons program (Hoodbhoy 2012: 136, Riedel 2011). 
In addition, for years, Saudi Arabia has attempted to purchase nuclear weapons 
and may have a secret deal with Pakistan. Mohammed Khilewi, a Saudi 
representative to the NPT, argued that Saudi Arabia had first paid $5 billion to 
Iraq to build the Saudis a nuclear weapon and then moved on to Pakistan (United 
Press International 2011). In the early 1990s, an American government specialist 
spoke with higher officials about Saudi Arabia purchasing nuclear weapons from 
Pakistan. He explained,  
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I raised my concerns over the Saudi purchase of a bomb from 
Pakistan with Washington but my government took Riyadh‘s 
response at face value. The US asked the Saudi foreign ministry to 
confirm or deny the allegation of nuclear cooperation with 
Pakistan. It is widely known that the Wahhabi form of Islam 
authorizes the faithful to lie to non-believers, especially in matters 
dealing with national security and state sovereignty. But when the 
Saudis said there was no Pakistan deal, our side, without any 
further investigation, accepted the answer (Levy, Scott-Clark 2008: 
226).  
 
As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia provided 60% of the funding for Pakistan‘s 
nuclear weapons and ―in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal (five 
to six warheads) off the shelf if things got tough in the neighborhood‖ (Borger 
2010). Several other news sources have echoed Borger‘s claim. There is not yet 
any conclusive evidence whether such a deal actually exists. 
Saudi Arabia‘s desire for nuclear weapons is due to instability in the 
Middle East and Iran‘s increasing attempts at being regional hegemon by 
developing nuclear weapons. However, the difference between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia‘s ambitions for nuclear weapons is that while Iran would rather build up 
their own infrastructure, Saudi Arabia does not have the expertise to do so. An 
official from the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission noted that,  
The Saudis did not want the process, unlike Iran. They were not 
interested in centrifuges. Riyadh did not have the scientists or 
infrastructure for these things. Saudis getting into enrichment 
would also have sparked a massive row with the US. They wanted 
the finished product, to stash away in case of emergency, and 
Pakistan agreed to supply it in return for many hundreds of 
millions of dollars (Levy, Scott-Clark 2008: 174). 
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In other words, purchasing nuclear weapons from Pakistan, readymade, would be 
the easiest way for Saudi Arabia to acquire a nuclear weapon.  
Clearly, the Pakistani-Saudi Arabian relationship is very strong. Pakistan 
is able to offer military support and in return, Saudi Arabia gives money to 
Pakistan for various reasons. Because some Saudi money is funneled into 
Pakistan‘s economy through educational and religious institutions, and 
consequently, the Saudis are able to influence Pakistan‘s politics. In a surprising 
WikiLeak cable, the Saudi ambassador to the US, Adel al-Jubeir, asserted that, 
"We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in Pakistan, we are participants" (Tharoor 
2010). Regardless, the two countries enjoy friendly ties. They are looking to 
institutionalize their relations as they work together to combat regional instability. 
Prince Turki bin Sultan, the previous former Saudi intelligence chief asserted that 
the Saudi-Pakistan relationship is ―probably one of the closest relationships in the 
world between any two countries‖ (Riedel 2008).  
5.3 Saudi-Iranian Relations 
 
Unlike the historically friendly Saudi-Pakistan relationship, the Saudi-
Iranian rivalry is deep rooted. Until 1935, Iran was named Persia, and so 
culturally, most Iranians self identify as Persians and conversely Saudis labels 
themselves as Arabs. Consequently, the competition between the Arab and 
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Persian dynasty manifests itself as the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in present day. The 
Arab and Persian empires were both leaders of the Muslim world and led 
successful empires until the Arabs eventually defeated the Persian Empire. Sadek 
Zibakala, an Iranian professor at the Univesity of Tehran, argued that ―Persians 
will never forget their defeat at the hands of Arabs in the Battle of Qadisiya 1,400 
years ago. It is as if a fire keeps seething under the ashes and is waiting for the 
right moment to explode‖ (Al-Zahed 2011). Some scholars, such as Amirahmadi, 
argue that the main sources of discord between Iran and Saudi Arabia are due to 
cultural and religious differences, a battle for OPEC leadership and struggle for 
regional hegemony.  
 Iran and Saudi Arabia first established diplomatic ties in 1928. Their 
relations were friendly especially when Saudi Arabia and Iran needed to 
cooperate politically when the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958. They 
were interested in safeguarding their own regimes. However, the last Shah of Iran, 
Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, pursued a foreign policy aiming at regional 
dominance. As Iran intervened in different conflicts in the Middle East, such as 
Oman‘s civil war, Arabs viewed this as Iran attempting to gain hegemony and 
consequently felt threatened (Amirahmadi 1993: 1).  
Relations between the Iran and Saudi Arabia worsened after the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Iranian Ayatollah claimed that the Islamic 
Revolution and Iran‘s new political set up served as a model of how Muslims 
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should be governed and consequently tried to spread the values of its revolution to 
communities that were ruled by monarchies. Because the Saudi monarchy was 
afraid of being overthrown, it emphasized ideological differences and 
delegitimized the Islamic Revolution by labeling it a Shiite revolution.  Fürtig 
argues that,  
Iran‘s attempt to present itself as the center of a worldwide Muslim 
awakening, despite denominational differences, and as the front-
runner of Islamic grandeur, had to be challenged. Therefore, Saudi 
propaganda started to castigate the Iranian revolution as an 
exclusively Shia one, underlining that Shiism was always 
antithetical not only to Wahhabism but to Sunnism in general, and 
that for these reasons Khomeini‘s Islamic must be considered 
blasphemous (2002: xvi).  
 
Because most of the Islamic Revolution‘s leaders were Shiite, it did appear to be a 
revolution based on Shiite ideals. In Saudi Arabia, Shiites were treated as second-
class citizens and the Islamic Revolution‘s call to revolution appealed to them. As 
a result, the revolution emboldened the minority Shiites in Saudi Arabia and they 
protested.  
 During the Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia supported Iraq by providing 
financial backing. In order to provide money to Iraq, Saudi Arabia increased its 
oil production and this consequently disadvantaged Iran‘s economy. The Saudis 
did not want Iran to conquer their neighbor, Iraq, and believed a revolutionary 
Iran posed a great threat to Saudi Arabia‘s security. According to Kayhan 
Barzegar, a Professor at the Islamic Azad University in Tehran,―the Iran–Iraq war 
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occurred because of the rhetorical exaggerations of Iran‘s traditional threat 
perceptions in the Sunni Arab world‖ (2008: 89). Furthermore, as Iranians killed 
many Iraqis, Saudi clerics declared, ―We should openly side with our Sunni 
brothers in Iraq and lend them all appropriate forms of support‖ (Shihri 2006). 
The Saudis were thus able to frame the Iran-Iraq war in terms of sectarian 
conflict. 
The Ayatollah made his views on Saudi Arabia clear. He believed that the 
Saudis were tyrants, followed an American version of Islam, and were not capable 
of protecting Islamic holy sites. As a result, he encouraged Saudis to revolt 
against their government (Amirahmadi 1993). In 1979, Saudi forces had to put 
down a protest started by Shiite Iranian pilgrims to Mecca. As a result, 275 
Iranians died (Fürtig 2002: 37). The creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in 1971 also signified a unified Arab stance against Iran. The mission of 
the GCC is to ―to effect coordination, integration, and interconnection between 
Member States in all fields‖ (Foundations and Objectives).  In 1982, the GCC 
Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara asserted that ―Iran‘s quest for supremacy in 
the Gulf was the primary threat to the stability of the GCC‖ (Okruhlik 2003: 116).  
Again, in 1987, Saudi officials stopped a political demonstration started by 
Iranian pilgrims to the holy city of Mecca. As a result, 450 Iranians died and this 
was one of the bloodiest events since the Iranian Revolution. Consequently, the 
Ayatollah declared that the Saudi monarchy should be overthrown and for the 
60 
 
 
 
next three years, Iranians did not visit religious sites in Saudi Arabia. In 1988, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran broke off diplomatic ties and this marked an all time low in 
the Saudi Arabia and Iran relationship. 
Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, relations between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia improved. The Iranian President wanted to establish economic ties 
and sought friendly relations with Saudi Arabia for post-war reconstruction 
(Jahner 2013: 42). Relations between Iran and the GCC also improved. The Gulf 
countries no longer viewed Iran as exporting its revolution or attempting to 
increase its sphere of influence. The nineties era was one of cooperation between 
Iran and the Gulf States.  
Nonetheless, relations turned sour years later during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan when Iran and Saudi Arabia supported rival groups. Saudi Arabia 
favored Pakistani influence over Afghanistan and gave financial backing to the 
Sunni Taliban. On the other hand, Iran supported Afghan Shiites, most notably 
the Hazaras. Iran soon realized that supporting the minority Afghan Shiites would 
not sufficiently fight the Saudi-backed Taliban and consequently supported the 
opposing faction, the Afghan Northern Alliance. Once the Soviets left 
Afghanistan and Pakistani involvement decreased, Iran and Saudi Arabia were the 
only two remaining foreign actors. Fürtig argues that it became a ―contest for 
influence between Saudi Wahhabism and Iranian Shiism‖ (2002: 162). For 
example, in 2006, an Iranian built a Shiite Islamic university and religious school 
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in Western Kabul and recently, Saudi Arabia announced a plan to build an Islamic 
education and mosque on Kabul‘s hilltop known as ―Tap-e-Maranjan (Khalil 
2011). Despite the institutionalization of a Sunni government, the Iranian-Saudi 
competition appears to continue in Afghanistan. 
In 2003, about a decade after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, the US 
invaded Iraq and overthrew the government led by Saddam Hussein. Prior to the 
invasion, Iran and Iraq maintained a balance of power but after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein, Saudi Arabia emerged as Iran‘s competitor in gaining regional 
hegemony. An Iranian expert on nonproliferation, terrorism, and Middle Eastern 
security Shahram Chubin, asserts that the fall of Hussein,  
Meant that the old triangular system, in which the three large Gulf 
powers of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq balanced one another, was 
replaced by a bipolar structure pitting Iran and Saudi Arabia 
directly against each other (2009: 168).  
 
Because Iraq was plagued by internal problems, it no longer sought regional 
influence Prior to the invasion, the Sunni Hussein government was hostile to 
Iranian interests and repressive of Iraqi Shiites. With its fall, Iran gained influence 
over the Shiite majority. Additionally, the US invasion of Iraq emboldened Shiites 
throughout the Middle East and this renewed Arab fears of Iran exporting its 
revolution (Nasr 2006). Iran was able to garner support from Shiites by claiming 
that the House of Saud was a lackey for the US. As Wehrey argues, ―The 
fundamental driver of the relationship [between Iran and Saudi Arabia] is a 
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struggle to shape the regional balance of power,‖ (2009: xxi). In sum, the 2003 
US invasion created a power imbalance and led to the modern day struggle for 
balance of power between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  
Iran‘s system of alliances in the Middle East has created the ―Shia 
crescent.‖ This term refers to Iran‘s Shiite allies, such as Syria, and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon. Whether or not the crescent has formed on an ideological basis, its 
formation was a reaction to the alliance of Sunni monarchies. In other words, 
several Shiite states and groups have banded together in response to the 
unfriendliness of Sunni Arab monarchies and consequently, their opposition has 
strengthened the fact that they are Shiite governments. For example, when Sunni 
monarchies opposed Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, the Alawite (a school of thought 
similar to Shiism) government of Syria aided Iran. Furthermore, the new Shiite 
government in Iraq has sought friendly ties with Iran because it is surrounded by 
unfriendly Sunni states (Barzegar 2008: 93). The Shiite government in Iraq was a 
setback to Saudi Arabia‘s attempts at regional dominance as Saudi Arabia lost an 
ally and gained an enemy.   
Saudi Arabia has viewed Iran as attempting to gain influence due to its 
support of proxies in the Arab sphere of the Middle East. For example, in the 
2006 Israel-Lebanon war, Iran supported the Shiite Lebanese rebel group, 
Hezbollah. Iran supplies Hezbollah with about $100 million a year, arms, missiles 
and rockets (Byman 2012: 2). Because of the large number of Sunni monarchies 
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in the Middle East that have allied with one another, Iran has proxies in order to 
gain some regional influence. Iran allied with Hamas in Gaza and began 
―gradually establishing its foothold in the Levant region‖ (Heydarian 2010). As a 
result, these proxies often work against governments that are hostile to Iran. Due 
to Iran‘s involvement in other states, Saudi Arabia and Iran often engage in a 
proxy war. For example, they engaged in a proxy war in Yemen, where the Saudi-
backed Yemeni government had to fight against the Iranian-financed Shiite 
Houthi (Yemeni) insurgents. The rebels met violent Saudi attacks and were put 
down.  
Saudi Arabia may also be supporting Sunni proxies within Iran. In 2009, 
Jundallah, the militant Sunni organization that is allegedly based out of Pakistan, 
killed about thirty people at the Iranian border, including members of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard. Iran put political pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting 
Jundallah and soon Pakistan caught its leaders and handed them over to Iran. 
Next, Iran executed those leaders. In November of that year, a Kuwaiti newspaper 
published a letter written by the head of Jundallah to the Saudi king asking for 
additional financial assistance. Jundallah attacked several times again in 
retaliation for Iran executing its leaders (Heydarian 2010). Jundallah is an 
example of supposed Saudi, American and Pakistani backed proxy operating in 
Iran in order to destabilize it.   
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The recent Arab Spring may redraw the map of the Middle East. Iran 
welcomed the revolutions in which people wanted to overthrow their monarchical 
governments because they are similar to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. With the 
fall of Egypt‘s president Hosni Mubarak, a man who viewed Iran with enmity, 
and the installation of the Muslim Brotherhood in office, Iran sought friendly ties 
with Egypt. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is wary of the revolutions. When the 
revolution spread to Bahrain, a Shiite majority country, Saudi Arabia moved to 
aid the Sunni monarchy in suppressing the protests which  the Iranians called the 
Saudi actions ―genocide‖ (Milani 2011). The Saudis claimed that Iran has been 
supporting protestors in attempts to remove the Sunni monarchy.  
While Iranian officials have been vocally critical of the human rights 
abuses in Bahrain and call for an overthrow of the Sunni Bahraini monarchy, they 
have taken a different approach in Syria. For Iran, Syria is an important ally 
because it serves as a route for transferring arms to Hamas in Palestine. Iran has 
been supporting the Syrian government in retaining its power during the Arab 
Spring. The ruling family is Alawite, a school of thought similar to Shiism. On 
the contrary, Saudi Arabia and other GCC members are supporting Syria rebels 
that are mostly Sunni. Although Saudi Arabia and Iran are supporting opposing 
sides, the civil war in Syria is not yet sectarian in nature. Regardless, many are 
voicing concern that Syria is turning into a Saudi-Iranian proxy battleground. 
National Public Radio (NPR) reported that Saudi Arabia is now sending young 
65 
 
 
 
Saudi militants into Syria to fight the Alawite government. NPR quoted human 
rights activist Muhmmad al-Qahtani who explained that ―Their [the Saudis] 
ultimate policy is to have a regime change similar to what happened in Yemen, 
where they lose the head of state and substitute it with one more friendly to the 
Saudis‖ (Erlich 2013). As the civil war continues to unfold, we will be able to 
decipher whether the Iran-Saudi competition manifests itself on sectarian lines in 
Syria.  
Iran and Saudi Arabia clearly hold animosity for one another. They 
compete for cultural, religious, economic and politic influence in the Middle East. 
Their balance of power is maintained by supporting proxies and allying with 
different governments. Some consider their involvement in other states a zero sum 
game because if one state gains, the other loses. In an interview with the Carnegie 
Endowment, Middle East expert Christopher Boucek explains,  
The challenge is that both countries view power and influence in 
the region as a zero-sum game. If Iran gains, Saudi Arabia loses—
and vice versa. In Saudi Arabia there is not just a fear that Iran 
wants a greater role in the region, there is alarm that Iran wants to 
control the region. Saudi Arabia often seems to view the region 
through sectarian lenses and wants to unite people under the 
sectarian umbrella of Sunnis. Riyadh therefore views the 
ascendency of Shias and the war in the region in zero-sum terms 
(2012).  
 
Clearly, in several major events, Saudi Arabia and Iran have supported opposing 
sides, and the two states are constantly challenging one another in other ways. For 
example, Saudis label the Persian Gulf as the ―Arab Gulf‖ and label the Iranian 
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province of Khuzestan as ―Arabestan.‖ The Iran and Saudi involvement in 
conflicts throughout the Middle East appear to be on sectarian lines. While Saudi 
Arabia tends to highlight sectarian differences, Iran does not always support 
Shiite groups and tries to play down ideological differences. Iran‘s support of 
proxies is mostly strategic, rather than ideological because its proxies always 
oppose some enemy of Iran, whether it be the US, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. 
Regardless, in many countries, such as Yemen, Bahrain and Pakistan, Iran has 
come to aid the oppressed Shiite group against Sunnis. Saudi Arabia usually 
views Iran‘s involvement in the Middle East as attempts at increasing its regional 
influence.  
Another way that Saudis view Iran trying to gain regional hegemony is by 
developing a nuclear weapons program (Whitlock, Sly 2011). As rumors surfaced 
about Iran developing an indigenous nuclear weapons program, Saudis became 
alarmed and vocally spoke out against Iran‘s suspected nuclear weapons program. 
It was revealed through WikiLeaks that the Saudi King Abdullah urged the US to 
―cut off the head of the snake‖ before it was too late. Furthermore, Saudis have 
warned that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons, then it ―would compel Saudi Arabia 
… to pursue policies which could lead to untold and possibly dramatic 
consequences.‖ Another official asserted that,  
We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and 
we don't. It's as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, 
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that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit 
(Burke 2011). 
 
 Some scholars believe that, in the case of an Iranian nuclear weapon, Saudi 
Arabia will not actually develop its own bomb (Oswald 2013). It currently does 
not have the infrastructure or expertise for an indigenous program. In addition, by 
pursing a nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia would violate the NPT would 
invite backlash from the international community. Many believe that in the event 
of an Iranian nuclear bomb, Saudi Arabia would purchase nuclear weapons from 
Pakistan due to its extensive funding of the Pakistani bomb. Furthermore, an 
unnamed official revealed that there is an agreement between Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Pakistan would supply 
Saudis with the bomb ―the next day‖ (Ozer 2010). However, a report from the 
Center for a New American Security asserts that in the event of an Iranian bomb, 
Saudi Arabia would most likely build up its military forces and use conventional 
and unconventional forces to oppose Iran (2013: 16). The report dismisses 
Pakistan‘s agreement with Saudi Arabia and argues that Pakistan would not go 
forward due to international pressure. It disregards the fact the Pakistan already 
defied the international community by pursuing its nuclear weapons. Furthermore, 
two states that support Pakistan economically, Saudi Arabia and China, will 
probably not cut off their aid or exert pressure on Pakistan if it gave weapons to 
Riyadh.  
68 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Sectarianism in Pakistan 
6.1 Origins and Causes 
 
Ethnic and sectarian differences prevent unity in Pakistan (Ahmed 1997: 
172). Pakistan currently has a population of 185 million people. About ninety-six 
percent of the population is Muslim and the remaining four percent consists 
mostly of Christians, Hindus and Sikhs. From the Muslim majority, eighty-five 
percent are Sunni and the other fifteen percent Shia. Pakistan can attribute its rise 
of sectarianism to Zia-ul-Haq‘s Sunnization policies and the consequently 
creation of madrassas, the Iranian Revolution and policies during the Afghan war.  
The Sunni-Shia divide occurred centuries ago shortly after the death of 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).  Sunnis wanted to choose the next leader of the 
Islamic empire based on majority vote. On the contrary, Shia, meaning ―partisan‖ 
wanted the head of the Islamic community, or caliph, to be directly related to the 
Prophet.  Sunnis believe that the first four caliphs, or religious leaders to be 
legitimate. On the other hand, Shiites view the last caliph, Ali (the Prophet‘s son 
in law), as the only legitimate one and give him a special standing with God.  
Sunnis and Shias have the same doctrinal beliefs. In the entire Muslim world, 
only Iran, Iraq and Bahrain have a Shiite majority. Numbering up to twenty-five 
million, Pakistan hosts the largest number of Shiites after Iran.   
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In Pakistan, Sunnis can be divided into Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahle Hadith 
and the modernists. Historically, most Pakistani Sunnis are Barelvi and 
incorporate Sufi practices in their interpretation of Islam. Barelvis are the most 
liberal and open minded of Sunnis in Pakistan. They emphasize the importance of 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), worship saints and ―embody popular religion as 
experienced by the masses‖ (Jaffrelot 2012: 223). Punjab has the largest number 
of Barelvis. The Barelvi‘s biggest rivals are the fundamentalist Deobandis, which 
are most similar to the strict Saudi Wahhabis. Historically, they have been the 
most numerous in Sindh but also have considerable influence in Balochistan and 
Pakhtunkhwa. Recently, Deobandis have spread to Punjab by establishing 
religious schools (Jaffrelot 2002: 222). They criticize the Sufi practice of 
worshipping saints. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),Sipah-e-Sahaba 
Pakistan (SSP), Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-Jihadul Islami (HUJI), and most 
Pakistani Taliban groups claim to be Deobandi. These groups gain new 
membership mostly from tribal and rural areas. Furthermore, their ultimate goal is 
to institute Sharia law in Pakistan. Another Sunni fundamentalist group is the 
Ahl-i-Hadith, and they are more radical than Deobandis. Lastly, the modernist 
argue that Pakistan should be a secular state in which religion is not a concern of 
the state. Unlike the Deobandis, Ahl-i-Hadith group and Barelvis, the modernists 
do not want Sharia law instituted in society. 
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Until the 1980s, Pakistanis Muslim lived together in relative peace. 
However, as mentioned earlier, Zia-ul-Haq initiated a process of Islamization that 
created the problem of sectarianism in Pakistan. The Islamization in Pakistan has 
also been dubbed a ―Sunnization‖ or ―Sharia-ization‖ because Zia‘s policies were 
not only Islamic, but very fundamental and conservative. The policies were 
mostly favorable to Sunnis and caused Muslim minorities to be neglected,  abused 
and outcasted. For example, in 1984, Zia-ul-Haq declared Ahmadis, a sect of 
Islam, as non-Muslims.  
Additionally, Zia‘s government began setting up Sunni madrassas. 
Madrassas are religious schools that take young impoverished children from rural 
areas and provide food, housing and clothing to its students.  Many Pakistanis are 
susceptible to the inexpensive madrassas system due to the weakness of the 
Pakistani education system. Pakistan spends about two percent of its GNP on 
education and consequently about sixty percent of the population cannot read or 
write (Bell 2007: 7). As mentioned earlier, Zia‘s newly instituted Zakat was able 
to provide funding for the creation of most of these religious schools. By sending 
their sons to these religious seminaries, the parents are not aware that ―their sons 
would be inculcated with a distorted version of Islam and instead of learning to 
read and write, they would be taught how to kill people‖ (Abbas 2005: 205). 
Because the education system was under control of the ulema, or religious class, 
the religious seminaries taught an ideological and conservative school of thought. 
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By involving the religious class, Zia‘s madrassas system was an attempt at 
improving Sunni institutions and at implementing Sunni politics in society. Due to 
Zia‘s policies, the number of madrassas increased dramatically. When Pakistan 
first became a county, there were only 137 madrassas.  
The combined policy of financing through zakat and official 
recognition of their qualifications led to an explosion in the 
number of madrassas: in 1974 they accounted for 18 percent of all 
educational establishments in Pakistan; by 1983 this proportion 
had risen to 40.3 percent. In 1999, the total number of madrassas, 
of all sectarian persuasions combined, was put at 7,000 (Jaffrelot 
2002: 232).  
 
Additionally, madrassa degrees were equal to the Bachelor‘s degrees given by 
other Pakistani universities. According to Shah, these policies ended Jinnah‘s 
dream of a secular Pakistan and consequently changed the social fabric of 
Pakistan (2005: 617). Zia‘s vision of creating an inclusive Islamic state was 
limited because it interpreted Islam through a Sunni lens. Shiites viewed his new 
policies as Sunnization and thought that their position in Pakistan was threatened. 
Zia‘s Sunnization process coincided with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
which added to the problem of sectarianism. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 gave 
Shiites throughout the Muslim world confidence. They were emboldened in their 
search for identity and rights. Shiites everywhere believed they could turn to the 
Ayatollah for support and consequently, they increased their political activism. 
Jaffrelot, a French expert on Pakistan argues that ―Iran did play an important part 
in politicizing the Shi‘a of Pakistan‖ (2012: 231). Consequently, the Iranian 
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Revolution ―set in motion, first, a struggle for domination between the Pakistani 
state and its Shiite population‖ and so Pakistan can partly attribute this for the 
change in sectarian attitudes within the country (Nasr 2000: 175). The Iranian 
Revolution represents a model by which an anti-state actor can overthrow the 
government in power, and consequently caused many leaders to fear revolution. 
 Iran did not use ―conventional war but rather ideological campaigns and 
sectarian-inspired civil violence‖ in order to influence Pakistani Shiites (Nasr 
2006: 160). For example, when Zia-ul-Haq began his campaign to Islamize 
Pakistan, he instituted a compulsory charity tax that was contrary to their beliefs. 
As a result, Shiites rose up and protested. They viewed his Islamization as in fact 
being, Sunnization. Shiites turned to the Ayatollah, who sent a message to Zia 
asserting that mistreatment of the Shia would mean, ―He [Khomeini] would do to 
him what he had done to the Shah‖ (Nasr 2006: 138). Next, twenty five thousand 
Shiites defied martial law when they gathered in the capital of Pakistan for a two 
day seige, demanding the taxes be removed. As a result, Zia repealed the 
compulsory tax for Shiites. Many, including the military and Sunni elite, were 
unsatisfied with Zia‘s decision to repeal the tax. Sunni Islamists thought that 
Shiites were preventing their vision of an Islamic state from becoming reality. 
The Iranian Revolution thus created Shiite activism in Pakistan and also 
encouraged Sunni extremism. With concerns of Iran attempting to export it 
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revolution, the Pakistani army was unhappy because they faced Shiite activists 
that were backed by Iran.  
Consequently, the Pakistani state promoted Sunni Islam in order to 
counter Shiism. The Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI (Inter-Services 
Intelligence) aided in creating militant Sunni groups and funding Sunni madrassas 
throughout Punjab and Balochistan (Nasr 2000: 177). The ISI concentrated much 
of its funding in Balochistan and on Pakistan‘s western areas, provinces that 
border Iran. An individual noted that ―If you look to where the most [Sunni] 
madrassas were constructed you will realize that they form a wall blocking Iran 
off from Pakistan‖ (quoted in Nasr 2000: 91). Militant Sunni groups argued that 
Pakistan had a Sunni majority population and they could treat minority Shiites 
inferiorly. Fundamental anti-Shiite rightists formed Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba 
Pakistan (ASSP) in 1985, which was renamed Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistani (SSP).  
This Sunni Deobandi organization was formed in response to the ―increasing 
Shia-activism under the impact of the Iranian Revolution. (Ali 2000: 26). The 
founder of SSP, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, argued that Iran, not Pakistan, was 
the home for Shiites. These fundamentalist Sunni organizations received help 
from Saudi Arabia, which funneled money through the Pakistani military and ISI 
(Abbas 2005: 204).  
Conversely, after the Iranian Revolution, Iran began offering educational 
scholarships to Pakistani students. Members of the Imamia Student‘s 
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Organization (ISO), a Pakistani Shiite student group established in 1972, formed 
Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) to fight for Shiite rights. This group began in 
1979 when members of the ISO became politicized and were emboldened by the 
Iranian Revolution. The ISO was the first occurrence of Shiite political activism 
in Pakistan. Their mission was to impose Jafari law, or Shia law, and they adopted 
Ayatollah Khomeini as their spiritual leader. Furthermore, Shiites created the 
militant Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-Jafaria (TNFJ) because they felt that the Sunni 
majority was oppressing their observance of Islam. Furthermore, TNFP was 
created in order to spread the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini (South Asia Terrorism 
Portal). Iran provided funding to TNFJ which further inflamed tensions between 
Sunni and Shia militant groups (Abbas 2005: 204).  
Apart from money received by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States due to 
Zia‘s Islamization policies, Sunni Pakistani religious parties received more 
funding during the Afghan war. Pakistani soldiers were called into the 1979 
Afghan war for jihad, or holy war (Shaikh 2008: 601). America and Saudi Arabia 
supplied Pakistani soldiers with arms in order to fight in the Afghan war. 
Religious parties in Pakistan recruited students from madrassas, which ―along 
with the Afghan refugee camps, become military training centers, where serving 
Sunni and Wahhabi military officers trained recruits, principally underage pupils‖ 
(Shah 2005: 616). Therefore, most of these Pakistani soldiers were anti-Shiite and 
targeted Shiites in Afghanistan during the war. After the retreat of the Soviet 
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Union in 1989, those soldiers formed militant Sunni groups in Pakistan. They use 
many weapons that they possessed during in the Afghan war (Yusuf 2012: 3).  
During the Afghan war, the arms and funding that Saudi Arabia provided 
to the Afghan Taliban aided fundamentalist Pakistani Sunni organizations that 
still continue to carry out attacks today. For example, Ramzi Ahmed Yusuf, a 
Pakistani Sunni extremist, who served in the Afghan war and attended a Saudi-
financed camp in Balochistan, was convicted for 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing. According to former Secretary and Ambassador of Bangladesh, Kazi 
Anwarul Masud, since 1994, more than 80,000 Pakistani militants have trained 
and fought alongside the Taliban (2013).  In 1994, the Pakistani government 
decided to do something about the rising sectarianism. Titled ―Operation Save 
Punjab,‖ the government conducted a search for sectarian leaders and 
consequently arrested forty activists and closed down many madrassas. However, 
concurrently, Pakistan was rounding up madrassas students to fight in the Afghan 
war. Regardless of the crackdown, militant organizations continued their 
activities. 
 In sum, Pakistan was not intended to be a battleground between Shiites 
and Sunnis. As mentioned before, Jinnah‘s dream was a pan-Islamic state in 
which religion did not matter. However, other Pakistani leaders had different 
ideas. Most Pakistanis believe that Zia is to blame for the direction that Pakistan 
is heading now, a direction filled with fundamentalist groups that are wreaking 
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havoc on the ordinary population. Because of Zia‘s institutionalization and ties 
with the Saudi clergy, Saudi Arabia now uses its petro-dollars to promote a 
conservative interpretation of Islam. It also uses its money in order to fund anti-
Shiite groups and fight a proxy war against Iran.    
6.2 Saudi and Iranian Involvement 
 
In dealing with state sponsored terrorism, it is often difficult to attain facts 
and figures. Despite theack of evidence, it appears that the Saudi and Iranian 
involvement in Pakistan can be best described as a Saudi proxy war against Iran.   
 Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Iran‘s initial support of the pro-
Shiite TJNF, Iran may have given less money and support to Shiites in Pakistan. 
However, Iran was active immediately following the Iranian Revolution on 1979. 
In 1986, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a religious decree 
proclaiming that the state of Iran must protect Pakistani Shiites (Vatanka 2012). 
Once Pakistani Shiites were emboldened following the revolution, Iran opened up 
cultural centers that promoted works by Iranian religious scholars. Furthermore, 
during the 1980s Iran was found to have given up to four thousand educational 
scholarships to Pakistani Shiites who wanted to study in Iranian cities (and this 
continues today). In return, these students went back to Pakistan and promulgated 
pro-Iranian ideas. With Iranian funding, they opened up Shiite madrassas (Zahab 
2002: 116). Middle East analyst Alex Vatanka notes that the Ayatollah‘s official 
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website has requests by Pakistani Shiites for funding religious institutions in 
Pakistan (2012). During the 1990s, Iran realized Pakistani Sunnis were stronger in 
strength and number, and so it focused its efforts on Shiites in the Middle East.  
Because it appears that Iran has reduced involvement in Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia now wages a one sided proxy war against Iran. Saudi Arabia uses soft 
power to influence the minds of madrassas students and Sunni fundamentalists. 
Saudi Arabia‘s friendly ties with Pakistan have always provided the country with 
economic aid. However, Saudi Arabia realized that Pakistan was strategically 
important ―in the erection of a ‗Sunni wall‘ around Iran‖ (Nasr 2000: 178). 
Consequently, Saudi Arabia wanted to harden Sunni beliefs in countries 
surrounding Iran, and as a result, it began heavily funding some of the main Sunni 
militant organizations in Pakistan.  
A reliable Pakistani newspaper, the News, recently observed that Pakistan 
gives about a third of funding to the religious seminaries from zakat while the 
remaining two-thirds are provided by foreign sources (Chandran 2000). In order 
to strengthen Wahabbism in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia gives charitable donations to 
the madrassa system. WikiLeaks revealed that religious and political leaders in 
Pakistan expressed that,  
Recruitment activities by extremist religious organizations, 
particularly among young men between the ages of 8 and 15, had 
increased dramatically over the last year. Locals blamed the trend 
on a strengthening network of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith 
mosques and madrassas, which they claimed had grown 
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exponentially since late 2005. Such growth was repeatedly 
attributed to an influx of ―Islamic charity‖ [due to] annual 
―donations‖ originating in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates… in the region of $100 million annually (Dawn 2011). 
 
According to a report by the Congress Research Service, Saudi Arabia has been 
found to be a supporter of terrorism as Saudi donors and charities give money to 
fundamentalists and terrorist groups (Branchard and Prados 2007: 1). Economic 
aid goes through charities and other organizations so that the Saudi government is 
not directly linked (Bell 2007: 20). For example, in a recent interview that I 
conducted with prominent Pakistani political activist and nuclear physicist Pervez 
Hoodbhoy, he narrated a recent incident in which a Saudi Airlines office in 
Islamabad was closed down because it was found to be a source of dissemination 
for madrassas funding (Hoodbhoy). 
As Deobandism is similar to the Wahhabism, most Saudi donations are 
funneled to Deobandi organizations. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the number of 
Deobandi madrassas has exploded in the last fifteen years. Saudi petro-dollars that 
are intended to promote Wahhabist ideology have created Deobandi madrassas. 
The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRF), a Saudi based charitable 
organization, has been found to give money to miltant groups in Pakistan. After 
the 2010 Pakistani floods, IIRF provided relief aid to Pakistan but a large portion 
of the money went to Deobandi madrassas and fundamentalist groups. In addition, 
as Figure 2 demonstrates, the proportion of Deobandi madrassas and Deobandi 
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Muslims in Pakistan are skewed. Because there is the largest amount of Deobandi 
madrassas, most madrassas students obey a fundamentalist school of thought. 
Consequently, many analysts have concluded that the Saudi funding of Pakistani 
madrassas has led to the creation of Sunni extremists. For example, in an 
interview with PBS, Vali Nasr explained,  
In order to have terrorists, in order to have supporters for terrorists, 
in order to have people who are willing to interpret religion in 
violent ways, in order to have people who are willing to legitimate 
crashing yourself into a building and killing 5,000 innocent people, 
you need particular interpretations of Islam. Those interpretations 
of Islam are being propagated out of schools that receive 
organizational and financial funding from Saudi Arabia. In fact, I 
would push it further: that these schools would not have existed 
without Saudi funding. They would not have proliferated across 
Pakistan and India and Afghanistan without Saudi funding. They 
would not have had the kind of prowess that they have without 
Saudi funding, and they would not have trained as many people 
without Saudi funding (2011).  
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Figure 1 Based on 2002 Report of Sindh Police in Dawn (Jan 16 2003) and the Central 
Board of Madrassas. Source: ―Shia Genocide 101.‖ AlexPressed Jan 28 2013.  
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Figure 2 Compiled by a Pakistani social activist .  
Source: ―Shia Genocide 101.‖ AlexPressed Jan 28 2013. http://blog.ale.com.pk/?p=2262 
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The impoverished madrassas students graduate only to reenter the world 
of religious extremism. Rather than become doctors, computer scientists or 
engineers, madrassas students become religious teachers or join militant 
organizations, such as the Taliban. Tehrik-i-Taliba Pakistan (TTP) or the ―Student 
Movement of Pakistan‖ is Deobandi organization that was created originally to 
fight in Afghanistan. Not only does Saudi Arabia provide funding for madrassas, 
but it also backs Deobandi political organizations. For example, Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi (LeJ) is currently one of the most active and dangerous anti-Shiite groups 
in Pakistan that Saudi Arabia provides financial backing. The Pakistani ISI openly 
supported LeJ until it was outlawed following the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Now LeJ works with TTP and al-Qaeda in order to continue conducting terrorist 
acts in Punjab. A Pakistani Muslim cleric explained, ―Saudi Arabia supports these 
groups. They want to keep Iranian influence in check in Pakistan, so they pay," 
(Georgy 2012). As revealed through WikiLeaks, former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton affirmed this statement by asserting that Saudi Arabia is a ―critical 
financial support base‖ (CBS News 2013). She added that ―Donors in Saudi 
Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups 
worldwide‖ (Walsh 2010). LeJ has claimed responsibility for the recent Shiite 
attacks in Pakistan.  
With the recent sectarian attacks in Pakistan, both Pakistani and Iranian 
Shiites have been dismayed at Iran‘s lack of action. When Sunni activities 
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increased during the ninetees, Shia leaders in Lahore and Islamabad who Hassan 
Abbas recently conducted interviews with argued that, ―Iran has been using 
Pakistan‘s Shia for its own political interests and that Iran‘s assistance did not 
protect Shia when Sunnis became more militant‖ (2010: 45). However, just as 
Saudi Arabia is suspected of supporting fundamental Sunni political parties, Iran 
is linked with Shiite political parties in Pakistan.Tehreek Nifaz Fiqah-e-Jafria 
(TNFJ) renamed Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) in 1992, has links to the Iranian 
religious class and commercial groups, according to the South Asian Terrorism 
Portal. The Shiite organization Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP) was founded in the 
early 1990s due to acts carried out the Deobandi SSP, which focused on Iranian 
targets. SMP targets members of the SSP and LeJ. An informational religious 
website called Haq Char Yaar, asserts that the SMP headquarters in Lahore, 
which is an inaccessible area for government officials, contains numerous Iranian-
made weapons. Furthermore, another Pakistani newspaper asserts that SMP 
members are trained and funded by Iran and have been targeting members of 
Sunni fundamentalist groups (Habib 2011). Part of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard, the Quds Force is a specialized militant unit that has carried out attacks in 
Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and is tasked with exporting ―Iran‘s 
Islamic revolution‖ (Wright 2008: 332). In October 2011, the US discovered a 
plot by the Quds force to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Adel Al-
Jubeir. The Quds Force cooperates with the Shiite SMP and in May 2011, 
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members of the SSP killed Saudi diplomat Hassan al-Qahtani in Karachi. 
According to at the Gateson Institute, the ―link to the killing was allegedly proven 
by recorded messages between Iranian officials in Islamabad and members of the 
terrorist group‖ (Mahjar-Barducci 2011). It appears that Iran still has some 
involvement with Pakistani Shiites.  
Whether or not the state of Iran or the Iranian ulema is still supporting 
Pakistani groups is still unclear from online data. Most of these political groups 
are underground and it is difficult to obtain information. The Saudi involvement is 
more apparent than Iranian participation in Pakistan. Regardless, many analysts 
believe that Iran will continue to aid its Shiite brothers in Pakistan. For example, 
renowned Pakistani journalist and Ahmed Rashid asserts,  
Iran has been very involved in the Shia–Wahabi conflict in 
Pakistan since the 1980s and I see no reason why Iran should stop 
being involved. Now I don‘t think it‘s involved the way it was in 
the 1980s when there was very fierce competition between 
Wahabism and Shiism in Pakistan but, generally speaking, there is 
competition and the Iranians are certainly not going to abandon 
their Shia protégées in Pakistan (quoted in Christsen 2011: 39). 
 
Therefore, it seems that in the times of need, Iran is supportive of its Shia 
brothers. Middle East expert Vatanka notes that,  
Iran‘s outreach to the Shia of Pakistan has historically fluctuated as 
a function of sectarian relations inside Pakistan and of Tehran‘s 
overall relations with Islamabad. When sectarian tensions rise in 
Pakistan and Tehran-Islamabad relations are poor, Iran‘s support 
for the Pakistani Shia has historically been at its strongest. In the 
early 1980s to the mid-1990s, for example, when sectarian tensions 
and violence expanded in Pakistan, the Iranian regime became a 
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strident supporter of the Shia and of militant Shiism. Now, given 
the deteriorating state of Shia-Sunni relations in Pakistan, and also 
given the fact that Iran‘s clerical establishment is under attack by 
―Shiite nationalists‖ at home, conditions may be ripe for Iran to 
take renewed interest in the plight of Pakistan‘s Shia once again  
(2012).  
 
Vatanka and Rashid‘s views signal that Iran will continue to support 
Pakistani Shiites despite the lack of conclusive evidence that it is currently 
doing so.  
  Pakistani Shiites often change their political tactics between cooperation, 
protest and violence.  Following mass Shiite killings during the nineties, the ISO 
decided to reduce its tit-for-tat actions against Sunni militant groups. Instead, it 
worked with the Sunni ulema to resolve sectarian differences. However, in recent 
years, sectarian violence has increased and protests by the Shiite community may 
mean they are desperate for change and will try fighting once again. For example, 
after protests that the Shiite community led in 2009, several leaders of Sunni 
extremist groups were killed, supposedly by Shiite militants. In recent months, not 
only have there been Shiite targeted killings, but also Sunni victims. This 
indicates that Shiites groups are turning to tactics that Sunni extremists groups 
have been using.  
It appears that Saudi Arabia‘s funding of Pakistani madrassas and political 
groups has exceeded that of Iran‘s support, and this has led to anti-Iranian 
sentiments in Pakistan, especially in political groups such as a LeJ.  Not only do 
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these Sunni extremist groups target Pakistani Shiites, but they view Iranians as a 
threat. In an interview with Reuters, the SSP leader (LeJ‘s parent group) 
explained that he believes that Iranian cultural centers and offices are covert 
intelligence offices (Hoodbhoy 2012). Average Pakistanis have also been 
influenced by anti-Persian sentiments. In my interview with Dr. Maqsudul Hasan 
Nuri, a Senior Research Scholar at the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad, 
he described how Pakistan is slowly moving away from its historical roots with 
Iran. For example, he noted how Pakistanis once said ―Khuda Hafiz‖ which is a 
Persian form of goodbye. However, now Pakistanis more commonly say ―Allah 
Hafiz‖ which is an Arabic way of saying goodbye. Furthermore, Pakistanis now 
call the holy month of fasting ―Ramadan,‖ as it is pronounced when written in 
Arabic rather than the Persian and Urdu pronunciation, which is ―Ramazan.‖ 
Because Urdu and Persian have the same alphabet, they pronounce words in a 
similar way (Nuri 2012).  There is a slow and subtle transition in Pakistani 
society, in which it is losing its cultural roots with Iran and moving towards Saudi 
Arabia.    
Pervez Hoodbhoy labels it a ―Saudi-zation‖ of Pakistan, which means that 
Pakistan is changing its policies to ones that appease Saudi Arabia. In our 
interview, he described how Professor Fateh Muhammad Malik was dismissed 
following his attempts at starting a Farsi department at the International Islamic 
University Islamabad (IIUI). Hoodbhoy attributed his dismissal to active Saudis 
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intervention who subsequently installed an Arab in Malik‘s position (Hoodbhoy 
2012). The reputable Pakistani newspaper the Tribune noted that  IIUI Arabic 
department faculty had complained to the Saudi embassy, which in turn expressed 
its disappointment with Malik‘s liberal policies and accommodations to Pakistani 
Shiites. For example, Malik also invited Iranian ambassadors to an event, a move 
that Saudi officials advised him against. Furthermore, Malik signed 
Memorandums of Understanding with numerous Iranian universities and 
explained, ―It is not the Zia era, the political reality has changed and we need the 
latest knowledge and technology to compete with the world.‖ In his attempts to 
open the International Islamic University Islamabad to the world, he was sent on 
leave for his progressive leanings.  
Saudi Arabia‘s use of soft power in funding madrassas and fundamentalist 
groups has most clearly manifested itself in increased sectarian conflict. In the last 
few years, Pakistan has experienced some of highest incidents of sectarian 
conflict. Anti-Shiite groups, most of which are funded by Saudi Arabia and are 
Saudi proxies, have carried out most of the recent sectarian killings. In January 
2002, President Pervez Musharraf banned the largest militant organizations, most 
notably Al Qaeda, SMP, TNFJ, SSP, LeJ, and TTP and for the next two years, 
there was a decrease in sectarian conflict. Pakistan began experiencing increased 
domestic stability in 2007 after which Musharraf resigned. Since he left office, the 
government has been largely ineffective in curbing the problem of sectarianism. 
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Militant groups have been able to carry out their activities and engage in retalitory 
violence. ―Pakistan has a conviction rate of 5-10 per cent at best, and significantly 
less in terrorism cases‖ (Fazli 2012: 3). Prosecutors involved in terrorism cases 
often dismiss the case because they receive death threats, and the government 
does nothing to provide them with security.  
There has been a large amount of sectarian-motivated killings in Quetta, 
Karachi, Lahore and Jhang. Prior to 2000, most of the sectarian conflict occurred 
in the northwest of Pakistan, where the Taliban resided after leaving Afghanistan. 
These hardened fundamentalists first targeted the city of Paranichar or ―Little 
Iran‖ because there was a large concentration of Shiites there. Recently, Karachi, 
Pakistan‘s most populated city, has experienced a large amount of sectarian 
conflict. Analysts, such as Amir Rana, head of the Pakistani Institute of Peace 
Studies, attribute this to the presence of sectarian groups in Karachi, even ones 
that are banned such as SSP and LeJ (Rahman 2013). The province of Balochistan 
also experiences a large amount of sectarian violence, and this may be due to the 
concentration of ethnically Persian Shiite Hazaras. Since 1999, Sunni militants 
have massacred more than one thousand Hazaras in Balochistan. The Hazaras 
argue, ―Our enemies are trying to paint us as Iranian sympathizers just because we 
are Shi'a. We are caught in the crossfire between some [Sunni] Arab states and 
Iran, and we are being massacred in their proxy war‖ (Siddique 2013). The anti-
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Shiite group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has claimed responsibility for most of the recent 
attacks.  
Since the release of the head of LeJ, Malik Ishaq, in July 2011, attacks 
against the Shiite community have increased (Fazli 2012: 2). He was released 
because he renounced violence. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace 
Studies Pakistan Security Report 2012, sectarian violence incidents and attacks 
increased by 53% in 2012 as compared to the prior year (2012: 1). Pakistani 
political analyst Huma Yusuf argues the sectarianism in Pakistan persists because 
militant organizations receive support from individuals, foreign agencies, 
Pakistani groups such as the ISI; the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani judicial 
system; persistence and lack of regulation of madrassas and political influence of 
sectarian organizations (2012: 6).  
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Figure 3 Source: Institute for Conflict Management, South Asian Terrorism Portal 
Note: Although 2010 had the highest number of injured people, 2012 had the greatest 
incidents since 2007.  
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Chapter 7: Findings 
 Due to Pakistan‘s geostrategic location and large population, both Iran and 
Saudi Arabia found it beneficial to, respectively, become patrons of Shiites and 
Sunnis in Pakistan. Zia‘s Islamization policies changed Pakistan‘s inclusive 
character by making many Muslims in Pakistan more fundamentalist, and the 
Iranian Revolution caused Pakistani Shiites to fight for their rights. Consequent 
Saudi and Iranian support radicalized sectarian political groups, which began 
conducting violent attacks in Pakistan. The result of Saudi and Iranian 
intervention has been an indoctrination of fundamentalist beliefs and sectarian 
conflict in Pakistan. Whether or not the Iranian-Saudi rivalry is primarily due to 
sectarian differences, the competition has manifested itself in sectarian terms in 
Pakistan.  
 Currently, the Iranian-Saudi rivalry appears to be more of a one sided 
proxy war that Saudi Arabia is waging against Iran. Saudi Arabia has been 
aggressive with its funding of Pakistani groups in the last decade because it feels 
that Iran is expanding its sphere of influence in the Middle East and that an 
Iranian nuclear weapon is imminent. The rise of Deobandi madrassas indicates 
that Saudi Arabia has been able to channel its petro-dollars into organizations that 
further propagate fundamentalist and pro-Saudi views. Furthermore, the rise of 
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sectarian incidents in recent years demonstrates that the product of Deobandi 
madrassas, Sunni militants, act upon what they have been taught at madrassas.  
Although Iran has visibly reduced its support of Pakistani Shiites groups, 
it may still be doing so by transfer of funds through religious charities or other 
underground tactics. Iran has a past of regional intervention, despite the threat of 
any looming danger (Al-Mani 1996: 80).  Furthermore, Iran is known to ―engage 
in espionage, proxy warfare, covert operations and a variety of other activities 
intended to influence regional outcomes in their favor‖ (Tope 2012). Its use of 
proxies throughout the Middle East is seen as an attempt at balancing Saudi 
Arabia and achieving regional hegemony. The alliance of Sunni monarchies 
favors Saudi Arabia‘s regional influence. Therefore, Iran finds it easiest to 
challenge their power by patronizing insurgent Shiite groups, such as the Houthis 
in Yemen and Shiites in Bahrain. Recently, GCC countries put forth a statement, 
―The council expressed its rejection and condemnation of the continuing Iranian 
interference in the affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council's states and called on 
Iran to stop these policies‖ (Al-Jazeera 2012). Most of the proxies that Iran 
supports are Shiites, with a notable exception of Hamas in Palestine. However, 
Hamas is not fighting a Shiite enemy, and instead its opponent is Israel. In Iran‘s 
foreign policy, it is important that a Muslim group is successful against a non-
Muslim side. It is important to note that Iran patronizes Shiites against Sunnis, but 
has never supported a Sunni group that targets Shiites.  
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In recent years, the international community has been speculating on when 
Iran will finally have nuclear weapons. Several states have argued that in a year, 
Iran will possess weapons of mass destruction. The United States, Saudi Arabia 
and Israel are especially concerned because a nuclear-armed Iran may be more 
likely to achieve regional hegemony and threaten states in the Middle East. 
Iranians believe their nation ―has been deprived of its ‗rightful‘ status as a 
regional superpower by foreign intervention, including the Russian, British, and 
American‖ (Baghat 2006: 323). Combined with the historical Sunni majority 
oppression of Shiite minorities, Iranians feel they must reassert themselves as a 
regional power. Kam argues, ―The regime‘s apparent expectation is that the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, with all the attendant prestige, would become a 
central element in building Iran‘s hegemony‖ (2010: 40). Most countries in the 
Middle East have a negative view of Iran and do not want it to become regional 
hegemon.  
Currently in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is balancing Iran and if Iran 
were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would challenge Saudi Arabia‘s regional 
influence. Regardless, Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it will not accept a 
nuclear-armed Iran and may attempt to purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan. 
Pakistan is unmistakably caught in the middle of a Saudi-Iranian rift. Should Iran 
choose to finally build a nuclear weapon, Pakistan may have to provide 
technology to Saudi Arabia and have a hostile nuclear-armed neighbor, or lose 
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Saudi Arabia‘s financial backing and suffer economically. In order to avoid such 
a scenario, Pakistan has been trying to dissuade Iranian officials from pursuing 
nuclear technology for the past decade. However, Pakistan cannot afford to abide 
by international sanctions on Iran because it needs Iranian energy sources for 
domestic consumption. As a result, Pakistan recently finalized the Pipeline Project 
with Iran.  
One of the most serious and dangerous implications of Iran acquiring 
nuclear weapons is that it will become more aggressive in its use of 
unconventional warfare. Because Iran already has a history of supporting proxies 
throughout the Muslim world, it will most likely continue that trend. Furthermore, 
groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Bahraini Shiites may become more 
aggressive and assertive in their demands and actions. Historically, when a 
significant event occurred involving Shiites or Sunnis, their Shiite or Sunni 
brothers in other states were emboldened. For example, after the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979, Shiites throughout the Middle East demanded more rights. 
Additionally, Sunni extremists in Iraq have been emboldened by events in Syria. 
Iraqi Sunnis are now protesting against their Shiite government, calling for 
changes in anti-terrorist laws that have led to the imprisonment of many Sunnis 
(Arraf 2013).  The Arab Spring also caused Bahraini Shiite to protest against their 
Sunni monarchy.  
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According to the stability-instability paradox, when states gain nuclear 
weapons, they are emboldened in lower levels of conflict. For example, states are 
more likely to engage in unconventional warfare and support proxies. Based on 
this theory, a nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened in its use of unconventional 
warfare. First, I do not believe Iran will resort to conventional war because of the 
system of alliances built up that oppose Iran. For example, the GCC is a Sunni 
coalition of Arab states that are suspicious of Iran‘s motives. Winning a 
conventional war in the Middle East would be near impossible due to the sheer 
number of enemies against Iran. Second, Iran may become more aggressive in its 
patronization of proxies. Last year, Daniel Byman, a Middle East researcher, 
noted that,  
Disturbingly, Iran‘s support for terrorism has become more 
aggressive in recent years, motivated by a mix of fear and 
opportunism. Iran could become even more  aggressive in the 
years to come, exploiting the perceived protection it would gain if 
it developed a nuclear weapon or, if thwarted through military 
force or other means, using terrorists to vent its anger and take 
revenge (2012: 1). 
 
Clearly, as Iran inches closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, it is becoming more 
aggressive with its use of proxies. The Arab Spring had caused Iran to not only 
has become involved in more conflicts, but also become more aggressive with its 
funding. Iran probably wants to gain favor with the new governments in the 
Middle East. However, this thesis is not how a nuclear-armed Iran will impact the 
Middle East, but rather specifically Pakistan.    
95 
 
 
 
 In my opinion, a nuclear-armed Iran does not mean nuclear war for 
Pakistan. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, they would, figuratively, not 
even be aimed towards Pakistan. Nuclear deterrence theory would uphold, and 
consequently Iran and Pakistan will not go to nuclear war. However, that is not to 
say that stability will result. According to Waltz, ―Policymakers and citizens in 
the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from 
the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, 
does stability‖ (quoted in Tope 2012). However, evidence points to the contrary. 
When the US and USSR both had nuclear weapons, stability did not result. When 
India and Pakistan both had nuclear weapons, stability did not result. Similarly, 
Pakistan is in the middle of a Saudi-Iranian competition and when Iran acquires 
nuclear weapons, stability will not result. Saudi Arabia is attempting to make 
Pakistan a Wahhabi nation and a direct enemy of Iran.  
As time progresses and Iran continues on its path of uranium enrichment, 
Saudi Arabia (and the US and Israel) are becoming more concerned about an 
Iranian nuclear weapon. As Saudi Arabia become more insecure, it wants to 
ensure its allies are against Iran and that Iran does not interfere in other states. 
Iran‘s involvement in the Middle East during the Arab Spring and consequent 
GCC reprimands support the fact that Saudi Arabia is effective in turning its allies 
against Iran. By funding madrassas and Sunni militant groups, Saudi Arabia has 
effectively turned a significant portion of the Pakistani population into anti-Shiite, 
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anti-Iranian Wahhabi style militants. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, 
these groups, such as LeJ and SSP, would not tolerate a Shiite reaction in 
Pakistan. Furthermore, just as Saudi Arabia supported Sunni fundamentalist 
groups in order to suppress Shiite protests and an Iranian influence in Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia will probably do so again. I believe that Saudi Arabia will not likely 
tolerate Shiites becoming more aggressive if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. It 
may put down a Pakistani Shiite protest as it did with Shiites in Bahrain. 
Regardless of the sequences in which the events unfold, Pakistan will probably 
experience domestic instability.   
I believe that Pakistan will experience instability after Iran acquires 
nuclear weapons because Pakistan has a divided population. The general Pakistani 
population is not too concerned about who is Sunni or Shiite but fundamentalist 
groups in Pakistan are attempting to propagate their ideological views. The Saudi 
and Iranian involvement in Pakistan during the 1980s planted the seeds for 
sectarian violence, and therefore the sectarian-driven attacks that are occurring in 
Pakistan today are a result of the Saudi-Iranian proxy war. However, due to what 
may be a lack of evidence, the proxy war appears to be one sided because Saudi 
proxies, such as LeJ and SSP, are successfully massacring Shiite communities. 
However, that is not to say that Shiites are the only victims and are dismayed 
from carrying out any attacks. Shiites have still been reacting to the violence 
conducted by Sunni militant groups.  
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The most direct effect of a nuclear-armed Iran on Pakistan is that Shiites 
in Pakistan will be emboldened. After becoming more aggressive, they will likely 
appeal to Iran for increased support. The stability-instability paradox applied to a 
nuclear-armed Iran and Pakistan spells out domestic instability and increased 
sectarian conflict in Pakistan due to Iran‘s use of unconventional warfare. As Iran 
already has a history of supporting proxies in Pakistan, I believe that Iran will 
become more aggressive in its use of unconventional warfare and will increase its 
funding of Shiite groups in Pakistan. However, Iran utilizing conventional warfare 
is unlikely because its resources are stretched patronizing different proxies 
throughout the Muslim world. Therefore, Iran will increase its use of 
unconventional warfare, as it did in Pakistan after the Iranian Revolution when it 
helped form Shiite militant groups that protected Pakistani Shiites and fought 
Sunni militants. Based on the stability-instability paradox, Iran would be likely to 
fund Pakistani Shiites because in Pakistan, Shiites are facing a Sunni enemy. 
Furthermore, Iran‘s past of getting involved in regional conflicts, specifically in 
support of Shiite minorities, increases the likelihood of Iran getting involved 
extensively in Pakistan.  
 The first step in triggering domestic instability in Pakistan is when Shiites 
become aggressive after Iran acquires nuclear weapons. The increased Iranian 
support, as based on the stability-instability will fuel Shiites to become more 
hostile and will incite a reaction from Sunni militants. Because Saudi Arabia has 
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heavily funded Sunni militants in Pakistan, they will not tolerate a Shiite 
insurgency. Furthermore, Sunni militants will likely be capable of fighting newly 
aggressive Shiites. If they are not, Saudi Arabia will continue its support of Sunni 
groups, or may get involved itself like it did in Bahrain, to make sure they are able 
to defeat any Shiite rebellion in Pakistan.  
 Regardless of the sequence of events, the stability-instability paradox 
predicts a situation in which Pakistan experiences domestic instability because it 
is the target of unconventional warfare on behalf of Iran. If Iran were to acquire 
nuclear weapons, not only would it become more aggressive but also so will all 
the proxies that it supports. There is evidence that Iran supported Shiite groups in 
Pakistan such as the SMP after the Iranian Revolution and may continue to do so. 
Those groups will probably become more active in carrying out sectarian-driven 
attacks. In the already hostile environment in Pakistan, Sunni militants will most 
likely react to an emboldened group of Shiites aggressively. In such 
circumstances, Iran and Saudi Arabia are more probable to support their proxies 
in Pakistan for a heightened proxy war. The result is a fragmented Pakistani 
population that is domestically unstable under the weight of sectarian-driven 
attacks.  
The stability-instability paradox also presumes that Pakistan will engage 
in an unconventional war with Iran by supporting Sunni militant groups. 
However, it would be logical to assume that Pakistan would not participate in an 
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unconventional war with Iran because of the failing economy, energy crisis and 
lack of infrastructure within the country. However, these issues did not stop the 
government and ISI from supporting Sunni extremist groups within Pakistan and 
the Afghan Taliban. There are speculations that factions of the Pakistani ISI 
currently support Sunni militant groups and also did following the Iranian 
Revolution. As a Pakistani who is worried about the government‘s failure to 
provide for its citizens, I would hope that the government would not use its 
resources to support an unconventional war against Iran. Nevertheless, if Shiite 
groups are emboldened in Pakistan and appeal to Iran for funding, I believe that 
Pakistan will continue its support of Sunni proxy groups within the country. Even 
if Pakistan does not participate in unconventional war with a nuclear-armed Iran, 
Pakistani Sunni militant groups will fight against Iranian proxies regardless of the 
Pakistani government‘s support. Saudi Arabia‘s funding has affected the hearts 
and minds of Pakistani Sunnis and transformed them into hardliner Deobandi 
militants, and this ensures that a proxy war will continue even without the 
Pakistani government‘s assistance.  
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Conclusion 
The main question I answered in this paper is how the stability-instability 
paradox helps explain why the Saudi-Iranian proxy war will cause Pakistan to 
experience domestic instability and sectarian conflict once Iran acquires nuclear 
weapons. The stability-instability paradox states that nuclear weapons bring 
strategic stability but encourage the use of unconventional warfare and limit 
conventional war. This is an important topic because many believe that Iran is 
likely to develop nuclear weapons in the near future and an Iranian nuclear 
weapon will have grave consequences for its neighbor, Pakistan, a country that is 
already domestically fragile. I researched this topic because an Iranian nuclear 
weapon spells out a dangerous situation for Pakistan. In order to understand how 
Pakistan will be affected if Iran develops the bomb, I applied the stability-
instability paradox to the relationship between Pakistan and a nuclear-armed Iran. 
As Pakistan slowly lost its secularity during the 1980s, the population and state 
became more Islamized and experienced increased sectarian conflict. 
Furthermore, it changed its relationship with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.  
By funding madrassas and then aiding in the creation of militant groups, 
Saudi Arabia made soft power an instrument of its foreign policy and was able to 
ingrain a Deobandi and Wahhabi school of thought in many of Pakistan‘s 
Muslims. In doing so, it turned Pakistani Sunnis against Shiites and Iran. Another 
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consequence of encouraging Deobandi ideology in Pakistan is a divided 
population that targets one another. In my opinion, Saudi Arabia does not want 
Pakistan to become sympathetic to Iran. For example, it was revealed through 
WikiLeaks that UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed said that 
―Saudi Arabia suspects that Zardari is Shia, thus creating Saudi concern of a Shia 
triangle in the region between Iran, the Maliki government in Iraq, and Pakistan 
under Zardari‖ (Guardian 2010). I believe that Saudi Arabia‘s paranoia regarding 
an alliance between Iran and Pakistan fuels its support of Pakistan Sunni militants 
groups so that the population becomes anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian at the 
grassroots level.  
The Pakistani state has been unable to counter the rise of sectarianism. 
Weak and often corrupt institutions are ineffective in solving the issue and 
historically, Pakistan has had several corrupt governments. According to Fazli, 
the ―key challenge is not that ‗society‘ is becoming more extreme, but [that] an 
increasingly permissive legal environment where violence spreads and violent 
groups proliferate without the threat of punishment‖ allows sectarian conflict to 
persist. (2012: 2). I have seen some instances of a grassroots movement on social 
media that call for an end to sectarian violence. However, it is difficult for an 
average Pakistani citizen to reach out to hardened militants and convince them to 
abandon their madrassa teachings. Until support for madrassas and political 
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militant groups discontinues, Sunni militants will exist. These groups often skew 
Islam and instead teach hatred.  Madrassas introduced sectarianism to Pakistan.  
I encountered several problems while researching and writing my thesis. 
First, as mentioned earlier, there was a lack of information. Conducting field 
research with militant groups would have been dangerous and near impossible. 
Furthermore, it was difficult to obtain official information regarding religious 
funding because Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran does not document all religious 
donations. Next, there was a problem with credibility and reliability of the 
sources. Some sources that I used may not have been credible. However, I tried to 
include information that other sources mentioned. Lastly, one of the biggest 
problems with my thesis is that it is hypothetical. I decided to research a nuclear-
armed Iran because I believe it to be likely in the near future. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that Iran eventually gives in to the international community‘s demands 
and does not develop the bomb. Furthermore, Iran may be so tied up with its 
proxies in the Middle East that when Pakistani Shiites appeal to Iran for aid, it 
does not give its support. Regardless, I did attempt to make predications based 
closely on Iran‘s past support of Shiite groups.  
Considering these problems, if I were to continue with this research 
project, I would conduct field research. I would speak with members of Sunni and 
Shiite militant groups in order to discover their linkages with Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. Moreover, I would ask Shiite groups how they view Iran and if they a 
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nuclear-armed Iran would encourage them to become more militant. I would also 
speak with Saudi and Iranian ambassadors to Pakistan in order to explore their 
involvement in Pakistan. For example, I would be interested to know how much 
funding they provide to Pakistan and who the recipients are.  
The conclusions that I formulated in this thesis were based on the stability-
instability paradox. Because this hypothesis is predictive, it is not yet falsifiable. 
However, once Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, my hypothesis can be falsified 
by showing that Iran is not supporting Pakistani Shiite militant groups and by 
demonstrating that sectarian conflict has not increased in Pakistan. The null 
hypothesis, that there is no relationship between a nuclear-armed Iran and 
instability in Pakistan, appears to be unsupported by evidence. If Pakistan 
experiences domestic instability and increased sectarian conflict once Iran 
acquires nuclear weapons, my hypothesis will support the stability-instability 
paradox.  
In order to avoid a situation in which Pakistan experiences domestic 
instability, the government should be careful of foreign aid that is transferred to 
religious schools and political groups. Furthermore, Pakistan should strengthen its 
ban of extremist groups, as it did under Musharraf‘s rule, in order to ensure that 
these groups cannot operate. Currently, the government disables cell phone 
service in specific areas on days on which it believes terrorist acts will be carried 
out in order to disrupt communication between people that may be plotting an 
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attack. It should continue with policies such as these to ensure the safety of its 
citizens. Lastly, the Pakistani government should try to encourage an inclusive 
environment and sense of nationhood that is true to Jinnah‘s dream. Pakistan 
should return to its secular foundations and extend rights to all minorities. In 
doing so, I hope that Pakistan loses its Deobandi character and is able to return to 
its colorful culture and rich traditions that I hold so close to my heart.  
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